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Joseph W. Geary, * David Mark Davenport,**
and William J. Minick, III***
I. ZONING AND PLANNING
A. United States Supreme Court
N a landmark United States Supreme Court opinion, a divided court
rejected a 1984 Fifth Circuit decision 1 to the extent that it defined men-
tally retarded persons as a quasi-suspect classification for purposes of
equal protection analysis under the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution. 2 At issue in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center3
* B.A., J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law, Geary, Stahl & Spen-
cer, Dallas, Texas.
** B.A., Central State University; J.D., University of Oklahoma. Attorney at Law,
Geary, Stahl & Spencer, Dallas, Texas.
*** B.B.A., Abilene Christian University; J.D., Pepperdine University. Attorney at Law,
Geary, Stahl & Spencer, Dallas, Texas.
1. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1984); see
Gary, Davenport & Jobe, Local Government Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 39 Sw. L.J.
567, 571-72 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Geary, Davenport & Jobe, 1985 Annual Survey] (dis-
cussion of Fifth Circuit decision in Cleburne).
2. "The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State
shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws ' which is
essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313, 320 (1985)
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV).
In analyzing the protection afforded persons under the equal protection clause, the United
States Supreme Court has announced three different levels of review. If the class of persons to
which the legislation pertains is a suspect class, then the court will employ a standard of strict
scrutiny in analyzing the legislation to determine whether it is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-18 (1982) (children of illegal immi-
grants are suspect class); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 97-101 (1982) (illegitimate children
are suspect class); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (alienage is suspect
class); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (race is suspect class); Oyama v. Cali-
fornia, 332 U.S. 633, 640 (1948) (national origin is suspect class). If the class of persons the
subject of the legislation is a quasi-suspect class, the Court will analyze the statute with inter-
mediate or heightened scrutiny to determine whether it is substantially related to a legitimate
state or governmental objective and closely tailored to fit that objective. See Mississippi Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-27 (1982); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766
(1977) (statutory classification must relate to a legitimate state purpose); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (intermediate scrutiny'requires that statute must serve important state
objective and have a close fit between the legitimate state objective and the statutory means of
achieving it). When the legislation has no suspect or quasi-suspect class as its subject, it will be
presumed valid and will be sustained if it has any rational basis for its enactment. See
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234 (1981). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 1083 n.10 (1978) (discussion of levels of scrutiny).
3. 105 S. Ct. 3249, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985).
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was an ordinance requiring a special use permit for the operation of a group
home for the mentally retarded.4 The circuit court reviewed the ordinance
with an intermediate level of scrutiny and held it invalid on its face, because
it did not "substantially further any important governmental interest." '5
Concluding that lawmakers' current widespread attention to the mentally
retarded obviated the need for the special treatment that the judiciary has
given to legislation involving suspect to quasi-suspect classes, the Supreme
Court initially rejected the Fifth Circuit's application of intermediate scru-
tiny and applied the rational basis test to the ordinance. 6 The majority in
Cleburne reasoned that increased legislative attention to the plight of the
mentally retarded was a key factor in refusing to classify the mentally re-
tarded as a suspect or quasi-suspect class. Justice Marshall, in dissent, how-
ever, properly noted that it was the extension of similiar legislative
protections to women that led the Court, in part, to extend heightened scru-
tiny to gender-based classifications. 7 The Justice noted that the Court's
thorough examination of the status of the mentally retarded in the commu-
nity and under the law was the type of careful inquiry associated with
heightened scrutiny. He suggested that the Court should perhaps term the
technique it used "second order" rational basis review rather than height-
4. The city of Cleburne took the position that a group home for the retarded was a
hospital for the feebleminded, and as such, its operation within an area zoned as an "Apart-
ment House District" required a special use permit. Id. at 3252, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 317-18. A
special use permit allows the operation of a use that would otherwise be prohibited under the
existing zoning classification.
5. 726 F.2d at 200.
6. "Heightened scrutiny inevitably involves substantive judgments about legislative deci-
sions, and we doubt that the predicate for such judicial oversight is present where the classifi-
cation deals with mental retardation." 105 S. Ct. at 3256, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 322; see 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(5)(B) (1982) (conditions federal education funds on a state's fair treatment of the men-
tally retarded); 29 U.S.C. 794 (1982) (outlaws discrimination against the mentally retarded in
federally funded programs); 42 U.S.C. § 6010(1), (2) (1982) (ensures the right to receive "ap-
propriate treatment, services and rehabilitation" in a setting "least restrictive of [their] per-
sonal liberty"); 5 C.F.R. § 213.3102(t) (1984) (facilitates the hiring of the mentally retarded
into the federal civil service by exempting them from the requirement of competitive examina-
tion); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-300, § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (confers certain
rights upon the mentally retarded such as the right to live in a group home). "That a civilized
and decent society expects and approves such legislation indicates that governmental consider-
ation of these [undeniable differences between the mentally retarded and others] in the vast
majority of situations is not only legitimate but desirable." 105 S. Ct. at 3257, 87 L. Ed. 2d at
323. This attention by the legislatures is also said to negate "any claim that the mentally
retarded are politically powerless in the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention
of lawmakers." Id. The concurring opinion in Cleburne by Justice Stevens, joined by Chief
Justice Burger, objected to the manner in which the majority's discussion tended to delineate
the three well-defined standards of review. 105 S. Ct. at 3260, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 327 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (preferring analysis upon a "continuum of judgmental responses to differing classi-
fications which have been explained in opinions by terms ranging from 'strict scrutiny' at one
extreme to 'rational basis' at the other." Id. at 3261, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 328).
7. Id. at 3269, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 336 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687-88 (1973): "[O]ver the past decade,'
Congress has itself manifested an increasing sensitivity to sex-based classifications [citing ex-
amples]. Thus, Congress itself has concluded that classifications based upon sex are inherently
invidious, and this conclusion of a coequal branch of Government is not without significance




Although the Court refused to apply an increased level of scrutiny to the
mentally retarded as a class, it found no rational basis for a distinction be-
tween the permit requirements for homes of the mentally retarded and those
for the city's other special care and multiple-dwelling facilities. 9 Rather
than holding the ordinance itself void, however, the Cleburne majority held
that the ordinance in question was unconstitutional only to the limited ex-
tent that it applied to the respondent's home.' Consequently, although
Cleburne clearly stands for the proposition that the law does not entitle the
mentally retarded to increased equal protection scrutiny, the opinion is of
little utility to local legislators. The Court's holding that the ordinance was
not facially invalid, but only unconstitutional as applied, hinders legislators
attempting to draft ordinances or regulations dealing with the mentally re-
tarded as a special class of persons."
B. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
In Mayes v. City of Dallas12 the plaintiff brought suit for damages and to
enjoin the city's application of a historic preservation zoning ordinance that
the city had used to deny him permission to paint his brick home and to
construct a walkway across his front lawn. 13 In affirming the decisions of
the lower courts, the Fifth Circuit first noted that a municipality possesses
the constitutional authority to zone private property in order to preserve
historic sites.' 4 The plaintiff did not attack the power of the legislature to
enact historic preservation legislation, but rather challenged the ordinance's
8. 105 S. Ct. at 3264, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 332 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
9. Id. at 3258-60, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 324-27. Although the Cleburne majority rejected the
application of heightened scrutiny, it nevertheless held that the ordinance's application in the
instant case failed the rational basis test. Consequently, Cleburne is important as the only case
to the authors' knowledge in which local legislation has failed to pass the rational basis test.
10. Id. The dissent pointed out that this "as applied" approach to an equal protection
challenge has never been utilized by the Court in the past. Id. at 3274, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 343
(Marshall, J., dissenting in part). For cases in which the preferred course of adjudication was
to strike the entire statute down as opposed only to its instant application, see Caban v. Mo-
hammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). The
majority's apparent reasoning for its limited holding was that when an ordinance may be held
invalid as applied to a particular person, such an approach "enables courts to avoid making
unnecessarily broad constitutional judgments." 105 S. Ct. at 3258, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 325.
11. Justice Marshall's dissent chastises the majority for utilizing this "as applied" ap-
proach, stating that "the city should not be allowed to keep its ordinance on the books intact
and thereby shift to the courts the responsibility to confront the complex empirical and policy
questions involved in updating statutes affecting the mentally retarded." Id. at 3273, 87 L. Ed.
2d at 343 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
12. 747 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1984).
13. Dallas, Tex., Code § 51-4.501(b)(1) provides that a person "shall not alter an exterior
feature of a historic landmark that is governed by this section or an ordinance establishing a
historic overlay district" without first complying with a certificate of appropriateness proce-
dure. 747 F.2d at 324. The plaintiff's home was located within a historic preservation district
created by an ordinance of the city of Dallas and he was denied permission to make the re-
quested improvement.




alleged lack of specific standards. Such standards, urged the plaintiff, pre-
vent arbitrary actions by agencies that approve certificates of appropriate-
ness.' 5 The court disagreed with the plaintiff's argument that the city must
draw historic preservations guidelines narrowly to pass constitutional mus-
ter and upheld the reviewing commission's right to exercise reasonable ad-
ministrative discretion in disallowing cosmetic and structural changes to
buildings within the historic district.16
C. Texas Supreme Court
The Texas Supreme Court decided one important case during the Survey
period in the zoning and planning area. In City of Round Rock v. Smith17 a
group of homeowners brought suit against the city of Round Rock for flood
damages. The homeowners claimed that the city had acted negligently in
originally approving a subdivision plat that allowed the developer to fill the
natural watercourses that provided drainage for the area.' 1 On appeal from
the trial court's dismissal for failure to state a cause of action, the supreme
court considered whether subdivision plat approval is a proprietary function
for which the city has liability for damages, or a governmental function that
leaves it immune from damage suits. 19 In its determination of the type of
function associated with plat approval, the court acknowledged the statutory
mandate that a city approve or disapprove a proposed plat and that the pri-
mary purpose of subdivision plat approval is to promote the health, safety,
15. 747 F.2d at 324-25. The specific subjective requirements complained of by appellant
required the colors of a building to "harmonize with the structure's facade as well as comple-
ment the overall character of the District," and required that walkways be "compatible with
• . .walkways of surrounding structures. " Id. at 325 (quoting Dallas, Tex., Code §§ 5.1 & 5.2)
(emphasis added). The plaintiff's argument was that the breadth and vagueness of these stan-
dards operated in violation of his due process guarantees under the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution. 747 F.2d at 324.
16. 747 F.2d at 324. Although the court of appeals upheld the ordinance in Mayes on the
authority of a municipality to regulate historic preservation districts, the decision is supported
by the court's having taken notice of the fact that qualified, professional personnel were in-
volved in the regulatory process, the guideline principals had been applied consistently, and
"an elaborate decisionmaking and appeal process provide[d] for ultimate review by the City
Council." Id. at 326; see Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1060-64 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905 (1976).
17. 687 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. 1985).
18. The city approved the subdivision plat proposed by the developer of the raw land, the
developer sold the lots to a builder, and the improved lots were then sold to the plaintiff-
homeowners.
19. The general common law rule regarding municipal liability is that the municipality is
immune from damages suffered by proprietary acts of the local governing body, but will be
liable for damages resulting from its performance of governmental functions. City of Galves-
ton v. Posnainsksy, 62 Tex. 118, 127 (1884) (this landmark case was a suit for injury resulting
from a fall into a neglected drain bordering a city sidewalk). Proprietary functions are per-
formed in the exercise of powers "voluntarily assumed-powers intended for the pri/ate ad-
vantage and benefit of the locality and its inhabitants." Id. The court in Smith referred to
proprietary functions generally, as "ministerial acts which could be performed by a private
subcontractor." 687 S.W.2d at 303. Governmental functions are performed in the exercise of
"powers conferred on them for purposes essentially public-purposes pertaining to the admin-
istration of general laws made to enforce the general policy of the State." Posnainsksy, 62 Tex.




and morals of the general public. 20 Furthermore, the court recognized that
the planning commission, in approving subdivision plats, must consider the
city plan, applicable ordinances, and state laws. The court found that plat
approval or disapproval constituted a discretionary function appropriate for
a governmental body.2' Having determined that approval of a subdivision
plat is a governmental function, the supreme court held that the doctrine of
governmental immunity barred the homeowners' claim for negligent plat ap-
proval. 22 The court then addressed the homeowners' alternative contention
that plat approval amounted to inverse condemnation of their property.23
The court denied the alternative claim on the basis that the original devel-
oper who had filled the watercourses and submitted the plats for approval
was the current owner of all property affected by the action. 24 The court
consequently found that the original developer had expressly consented to
the act that the homeowners alleged constituted a taking without just com-
pensation. 25 The court noted that the Texas Constitution does not prohibit
the taking of private property when the property owner consents to such
action. 26 The action did not entitle the homeowners to damages, therefore,
since they claimed title from the developer and, thus, were bound by the
consent of their predecessor in title.27
20. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 974(a), § 4 (Vernon 1963) provides (emphasis
added):
If such plan or plat, or replat shall conform to the general plan of said city and
its streets, alleys, parks, playgrounds and public utility facilities .... and if same
shall conform to such general rules and regulations, if any, governing plats and
subdivisions of land failing within its jurisdiction as the governing body of such
city may adopt and promulgate to promote the health, safety, morals or general
welfare of the community, ... then it shall be the duty of said City Planning
Commission or of the governing body of such city, as the case may be, to endorse
approval upon the plan, plat or replat submitted to it.
Interestingly, the Smith court, in effect, admitted that the city had failed to effectuate the
health, safety, and morals purpose of art. 974(a) when it stated that "[pilat approval protects
future purchasers from ... inadequate drainage." 687 S.W.2d at 302. Clearly, in light of the
flood damage suffered, the plaintiffs had not been afforded this protection.
21. 687 S.W.2d at 302-03. The Smith court compared the exercise of planning approval
to the exercise of zoning approval, which is widely recognized as a police power. See
Lombardo v. City of Dallas, 124 Tex. 1, 9, 73 S.W.2d 475, 478 (1934); Edge v. City of Bellaire,
200 S.W.2d 224, 226 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1947, writ refd); Hunt v. City of San
Antonio, 462 S.W.2d 436, 539 (Tex. 1971). "Plat approval, like zoning, is an exercise of the
police power." Smith, 687 S.W.2d at 302.
22. 687 S.W.2d at 303; see Ellis v. City of West Univ. Place, 141 Tex. 608, 610, 175
S.W.2d 396, 397 (1943) (city not liable for damages resulting from attempt to enforce ordi-
nance); Presley v. City of Odessa, 263 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1952, writ
refd n.r.e.) (city generally not liable for negligent operation of traffic lights).
23. Inverse condemnation is a cause of action pleaded by a landowner claiming that the
condemning governmental authority has damaged or taken his property for a public purpose
without expressly taking the property by eminent domain proceedings and providing just com-
pensation for that loss as required by TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17, and U.S. CO NST. amend. V. In
essence, the homeowners in Smith claimed that the city's approval of the plat resulted in the
flooding of their property, which rendered it unusable to the appellants, thereby entitling them
to just compensation.
24. 687 S.W.2d at 303.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. Following Smith, it may be argued that a developer has no incentive in Texas to
19861
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D. Texas Courts of Appeals
The courts of appeals decided several significant zoning and planning
cases during the Survey period. Perhaps the most important of these was
Strong v. City of Grand Prairie.2 8 The Strong case provides the first judicial
interpretation of Texas Revised Civil Statutes article 1011e2 9 since
amended, 30 which provides:
In case, however, of a written protest against such change, signed by the
owners of 20 per cent or more either of the area of the lots or land
included in such proposed change, or of the lots or land immediately
adjoining the same and extending 200 feet therefrom, such amendment
shall not become effective except by the favorable vote of three-fourths
of all members of the legislative body of such municipality.31
In Strong the city council of Grand Prairie denied a landowner's request for
a zoning change to permit the use of his property as a cemetery because the
change did not receive the required three-quarters favorable vote. The land-
owner brought suit seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Appealing the
denial of relief from the trial court, the appellant argued that the lower court
had erred in not including city streets in the formula for determining
whether the required twenty percent of the specified property owners had
signed the protest petition.32 The Fort Worth court of appeals rejected the
appellant's argument as ignoring the intent of the legislature to permit pro-
tests only by owners of real property as reflected by the most recent city tax
roll.33 The court reasoned that this requirement obviously excluded tax-ex-
empt municipalities from the calculation of the affected property owners al-
lowed to vote on the proposition.3 4
Possibly recognizing the computational difficulties the Strong decision cre-
ated,35 the legislature amended article 101le during the Survey period to
protect future homeowners from the type of harm suffered by plaintiffs. In Texas, only renters
of real property are protected by an implied warranty of habitability. See TEx. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 92.052 (Vernon 1984).
28. 679 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ).
29. See Act of May 24, 1985, ch. 201, § 1, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1067 (Vernon)
(codified as amended at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 101 le (Vernon Supp. 1986)).
30. See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
31. Id. The Strong court stated:
It is perceived that this statute creates two classes or categories of protests
against zoning changes by adjoining property owners: (1) by the owners of 20%
or more of the lots or land within the proposed zoning charge area itself, and,
(2) by the owners of 20% or more of the lots or land immediately adjoining such
area and extending 200 feet therefrom.
679 S.W.2d at 769.
32. Id. Had the streets been included in the computation, then less than 20% of the re-
quired property owners would have signed the petition because the city had not signed it.
33. Id. at 770 (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 101 If (Vernon Supp. 1984)).
34. 679 S.W.2d at 770. The reasoning of the court is that, obviously, the city owning the
streets does not pay taxes and, therefore, does not appear on the city tax roll. Id.
35. In determining which landowners are eligible to protest a zoning change and whether
those who have protested are sufficient in number to force a super-majority city council vote,
apparently no method short of a professional (and costly) land survey would ensure accuracy if
streets and alleys were excluded. The method currently employed by many Texas cities is to
identify the landowners eligible to protest by simply drawing a circle on a map with a compass
[Vol. 40
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provide expressly for the inclusion of streets and alleys in the protest area
computation.3 6
In City of Webster v. Signad, Inc. 37 the owner of several billboards dam-
aged in a hurricane successfully challenged the constitutionality of a munici-
pal ordinance prohibiting the repair of roadway signs that had suffered
substantial damage.38 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
the appellee on grounds that the ordinance violated the due process provi-
sions of the Texas and United States Constitutions.3 9 In affirming the order
of the trial court, the appeals court stated that citizens of average intelligence
were left to speculate on the meaning of that section of the ordinance that
prohibited substantial repairs.4° The court held that the city must implement
further guidelines to define damage to substantial parts in economic, physi-
cal, and functional terms in order to comply with constitutional due process
(or palimeter) around the area for which rezoning is sought. See Dallas, Tex., Development
Code § 51-4.701 (specifically provides for the inclusion of streets and alleys). Note also that
the legislature's rationale in including city streets in the appropriate computations may be
equally applicable to the inclusion of city parks and other publicly owned land.
36. See Act of May 24, 1985, ch. 201, § 1, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1067 (Vernon)
(codified as amended at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1011e (Vernon Supp. 1986)). The
potential for municipal misconduct as a result of the amendment of art. 101 (e) is evident.
Take the situation where a zoning change is requested and subsequently opposed by the city's
planning department. In such a case, the city attorney may file a written protest and alone, or
(depending on how much street or alley is involved in the computation) in conjunction with
less than 20% of the other surrounding property owners, force a three-quarters (rather than
majority) vote on the requested change. This, in effect, allows the municipality to defeat cer-
tain zoning change requests even though over 80% of the adjoining private property owner-
citizens may not oppose the change.
37. 682 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
38. The court quoted Webster, Tex., Code of Ordinances ch. 3, § 10H(2) as providing
that:
When any outdoor advertising sign, billboard, spectacular sign, business sign, or
business directory sign which would be unlawful or non-conforming hereunder,
but for the fact that such sign was lawfully in existence on the date of passage of
this section, or any substantial parts thereof is blown down or destroyed or taken
down or removed for any purpose other than routine maintenance operations or
for changing the lettering, symbols, or other matter on such signs, it shall not be
reerected, reconstructed, rebuilt, or relocated except in conformity with the pro-
visions of this section.
682 S.W.2d at 645-46 (emphasis added). The clear intent of ordinances similar to the one in
Signad, Inc. is to terminate the nonconforming use of a sign that doesn't comply with existing
city ordinances after it suffers substantial damage.
39. TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 19 provides: "No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life,
liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due
course of the law of the land." The United States Constitution, in the fifth and fourteenth
amendments, also provides protection against deprivation of life, liberty or property without
due process of law. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV.
40. 682 S.W.2d at 648. The Signad court reasoned that the use of the term "substantial"
was too vague to require the public to interpret and, thus, violated the due process require-
ments of the Texas and the United States Constitution. Id.; see Texas Antiguities Comm. v.
Dallas County Community College Dist., 554 S.W.2d 924, 928 (Tex. 1977) (holding the term
"of historical interest" to be unconstitutionally vague); cf Pennington v. Singleton, 606
S.W.2d 682, 689 (Tex. 1980) (regulatory statutes need to provide only a "reasonable degree of
certainty" to persons governed thereby and such "[s]tatutes are not automatically invalidated





In Collins v. City of El Campo42 the city and certain residents brought suit
against a landowner to enjoin the use of his property as a residence for four
unrelated, mentally retarded men and their supervising bouseparents. The
trial court enjoined the appellant's current use of the home based upon its
conclusion that such use did not comply with the applicable zoning ordi-
nance restricting the property to a single-family dwelling. 43 The critical is-
sue in Collins was the trial court's interpretation of the ordinance in question
as restricting the use of the appellant's property to occupancy by a single,
related family, as opposed to a group of unrelated persons. In focusing on
the legislative intention of the city in restricting the use of the property,44 the
court rejected the city's argument that only those dwellings designed for or
occupied by one family could come within the purview of the ordinance. 45
Furthermore, because the zoning ordinance did not define "family" in terms
of relation by blood or marriage, the house's mentally retarded occupants
and their houseparents could properly be considered a single family unit.
46
41. 682 S.W.2d at 647-48. Without reference to a percentage of value, particular parts of
a sign, or the purposes served by billboards, "each successive city engineer must select his own
standard for determining what is a 'substantial part' of a sign. Operators of outdoor advertis-
ing signs receive no fair and adequate notice from... the Ordinance as to what sign repairs are
permitted or prohibited." Id. at 648. One dissenting justice found the ordinance to provide a
reasonable degree of certainty, thus satisfying due process requirements. Id. (Doyle, J., dis-
senting). Justice Doyle first analogized to other uses of the word "substantial" as a "standard
of measurement in our jurisprudence." Id. at 649 (citing Lewis v. Metropolitan Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 550 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Tex. 1977) (substantial evidence); Warren v. Denison, 563 S.W.2d
299, 303 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, no writ) (substantial performance)). Justice Doyle
found the latitude in interpretation necessary "[gliven the 'untold and unforeseen variations in
factual situations, and the practical necessities of discharging the business of govern-
ment ... ' " Id. at 648 (quoting Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 689 (Tex. 1980));
see D- F v. State, 525 S.W.2d 933, 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (statute that allowed termination of parental rights as determined by the
"best interests" of child upheld); Houston Compressed Steel Corp. v. State, 456 S.W.2d 768,
774 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, no writ) (statute upheld that defined air pollu-
tion as presence in the atmosphere of contaminants in such concentration and of such duration
as "may tend to be injurious to or to adversely affect human health or welfare").
42. 684 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
43. The zoning ordinance in question provided:
Part II. DISTRICT USE AND AREA REGULATIONS
Section 6. "R-l" Single-Family Residence District
6-1. The regulations set forth in this section or set forth elsewhere in this
ordinance when referred to in this section, are the regulations in the "R- I" Sin-
gle-Family Reidence (sic) District.
Use regulations: A building or premise shall be used only for the following
purposes:
A. One Family Dwelling.
2-15. Dwelling, Single-Family: A building designed for or occupied exclu-
sively by one (1) family.
Id. at 758-59 (emphasis added by the court).
44. Id. at 759 (discussing rules regarding judicial construction of municipal ordinances).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 759-60. On the same grounds, the court also held that the appellant was not in
violation of a private deed restriction that prohibited use of the subject property for any pur-
pose other than as a "single-family dwelling." Id. at 760-62.
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Subdivision Plat Approval. In Cowbody Country Estates v. Ellis County4 7 the
appellant owned 100 acres of land that it had begun to develop into a mobile
home park for rental to the public.48 Ellis County successfully enjoined fur-
ther development and operation of the appellant's property on grounds that
its use for the leasing of mobile homes failed to comply with county subdivi-
sion rules and regulations requiring the filing of an approval plat showing
appropriate boundaries and streets prior to any subdividing of lots for sale.
The appellant initially argued that the leasing of mobile home spaces could
not be considered a sale of the lots, and, thus, the mobile home project was
not a subdivision requiring plat approval.49 The court of appeals, however,
rejected this argument, citing the primary objective of subdivision plat ap-
proval as the protection of public interests in health, sanitation, drainage,
and county road maintenance rather than simple regulation of lot sales.50
The court further reasoned that because public policy concerns are of no less
relevance to mobile home parks, which are leased rather than sold, the pres-
ent use of the project for rental was sufficiently analogous to a sale to cause
the ordinance in question to be applicable to this case.5'
The court also rejected the appellant's alternative contention that the
county subdivision rules and regulations pertaining to public roads were in-
applicable because the appellant had not dedicated any roads in the project
to public use.52 Citing evidence that supported the apparent findings of fact
by the trial court concerning the elements of an implied dedication,53 the
court held that the roads within the mobile home project were subject to
public regulation because the appellant had impliedly dedicated them to
public use. 54
City of Weslaco v. Carpenter5 5 involved facts very similar to those in
Country Cowboy Estates. In Carpenter a landowner had subdivided and im-
proved a fairly large tract of land for the purpose of renting mobile homes
47. 692 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. App.-Waco 1985, no writ).
48. The appellant's current use of the mobile home park for rental to the public was made
known to the county only after it submitted to the commissioners court a subdivision plan for
sale of the lots. The commissioners court denied approval. Id. at 884-85.
49. Id. at 886.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 886-87. In reaching this conclusion the court relied upon evidence that rented
mobile homes, like houses, are seldom relocated, that tenants were subject to applicable deed
restrictions and that, in addition, tenants had responsibility for maintenance of the lot that
their mobile home occupied. Id. at 886.
52. Id. at 887-88. The roads had been built slightly narrower than required by the county
rules for public roads.
53. The court noted that the appellant had contemplated sale of the lots for some time
and had made no provision for an operable gate or security office at the park's entrance. The
facts supported the inference that the appellant intended to dedicate the roads in the project to
public use. Id. An implied dedication of a private road occurs when a party can show that
(1) the acts of the landowner induced the belief that the landowner intended to dedicate the
road to public use; (2) the landowner was competent to dedicate the land, because he had the
capacity and fee simple title; (3) the public relied on such acts and will benefit from the dedica-
tion; and (4) the dedication was accepted. Id. at 888; see O'Connor v. Gragg, 324 S.W.2d 294,
296 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1959), reformed, 161 Tex. 273, 339 S.W.2d 878 (1960).
54. 692 S.W.2d at 887-88.
55. 694 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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and recreational vehicles. The city sought to enjoin further development un-
til the defendant complied with city code standards applicable to subdivision
of land. The Carpenter court also found no basis for distinguishing between
the sale and rental of individual lots given that the overriding purpose for
subdivision regulation is to protect public health, safety, morals, and general
welfare. 56 The court, however, went to slightly greater lengths than the court
in Cowboy Country Estates to emphasize that the key element of a subdivi-
sion is the division of one parcel of land into two or more subdivided parts.
The court reasoned that it is this division of land that triggers regulation of
the applicable platting statutes and ordinances and not the act of selling or
leasing the divided parts. 57 The one aspect of the Carpenter case that ex-
pands the holding in Cowboy Country Estates is the court's holding that the
city ordinance governing subdivision platting extended past the corporate
municipal limits to property within the city's extraterritorial jurisdiction.5 8
II. CONDEMNATION
A. United States Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court rendered one significant condemnation
decision during the Survey period affecting Texas municipalities.5 9 United
56. Id. at 604. The Carpenter decision was announced two months after Cowboy Country
Estates.
57. Id. at 603-04.
58. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is an area beyond the physical limits of a city, state, or
country to which its juridical power extends. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 528 (5th ed. 1979).
The Texas statute defining the extent of extraterritorial jurisdiction is TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 970a, § 3 (Vernon 1963) (extraterritorial jurisdiction varies according to population
of the city). See also id. art. 970a, § 4 (authority granted to cities to extend their subdivision
ordinances to extraterritorial jurisdiction).
In another zoning and planning case of lesser significance decided during the Survey period,
the Tyler court of appeals held that the city of Austin had no right to declare "arbitrarily,
finally and in advance" by city ordinance that the construction, operation, and use of a particu-
lar waste burning device was a nuisance per se. Air Curtain Destructor Corp. v. City of Aus-
tin, 675 S.W.2d 615, 618 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.). By enforcing the
ordinance without regard to the attendant facts and circumstances surrounding the use of the
waste burning device, the plaintiffs had been deprived of a vested property right without due
process of law. Id.
59. The procedure for exercising the power of eminent domain, as authorized in both
federal and state constitutions, is commonly referred to as "condemnation." The federal gov-
ernment generally uses one of two methods to appropriate private property for a public use.
First, it acts under the Declaration of Taking Act, 40 U.S.C. § 258(a) (1982), which vests title
to the property in the United States immediately upon the filing of a declaration and deposit
with the court of an amount determined by the government to be an appropriate award for the
property. If the amount deposited is less than the exact value determined in subsequent judi-
cial proceedings, the owner is awarded the difference. This section is generally limited to use
in cases of sudden emergency. Second, it proceeds in straight condemnation by filing a com-
plaint in condemnation pursuant to 40 U.S.C. § 257 (1982), whereby a panel determines the
offering price for the landowner's property, but title does not vest in the United States until the
government subsequently deposits this amount into the registry of the court. See Kirby Forest
Indus. v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 2187, 2190-91, 81 L. Ed. 2d 1, 6-7 (1984). In extreme
emergencies, Congress may exercise a third method of condemnation by appropriating the
property immediately and vesting title in the United States. This method is referred to as a
legislative taking and is authorized pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 79e(b) (1982). See generally
Geary, Davenport & Jobe, 1985 Annual Survey, supra note 1, at 576-82.
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States v. 50 Acres of Land6° involved a determination of the proper method
of compensation for a landfill facility owned by the city of Duncanville,
Texas, and condemned by the federal government as part of a flood control
project. Following the condemnation, the city acquired another site as a
replacement for the condemned facility and developed it into a larger and
more efficient landfill. The Fifth Circuit6 agreed with the city of Dun-
canville that when a public authority could demonstrate that it was under an
obligation to replace the condemned facility, 62 the general rule that fair mar-
ket value was just compensation 63 was inapplicable and the proper measure
of damages for the taking was the replacement cost of the new facility.64 In
holding for the city of Duncanville, the circuit court cited the Supreme
Court case of United States v. Brown,65 and concluded that the award should
be the reasonable cost of an equivalent facility, 66 discounted to account for
any increased capacity or superior quality of the substitute facility. 67
The Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's method of compensation
and emphasized that the Brown case had involved peculiar facts and had
made no statement regarding the proper measure of monetary compensa-
tion.68 The Court stated that Brown had recognized the right of the govern-
60. 105 S. Ct. 451, 83 L. Ed. 2d 376 (1984). The federal government initiated this con-
demnation proceeding by filing a declaration of taking pursuant to 40 U.S.C. § 258(a) (1982).
105 S. Ct. at 453 n.3, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 380 n,3.
61. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 706 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir. 1983). The decision of the
Fifth Circuit is discussed at length in Geary & Davenport, Local Government Law, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 38 Sw. L.J. 463, 476-77 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Geary & Davenport,
1984 Annual Survey].
62. Neither party disputed that the city of Duncanville was under an obligation to replace
the condemned facility.
63. See United States v. 3,727.91 Acres of Land, 563 F.2d 357, 360-61 (8th Cir. 1977);
California v. United States, 395 F.2d 261, 265-66 (9th Cir. 1968). But see United States v.
Certain Property, 403 F.2d 800, 802-03 (2d Cir. 1968) (necessity could require use of substitute
measure despite presence of ascertainable market value).
64. 706 F.2d at 1363-64.
65. 263 U.S. 78 (1923). In Brown the government constructed a reservoir, which neces-
sarily resulted in the flooding of a small town. As just compensation, the Court sustained the
government's efforts to relocate the entire town to a nearby area. Id. at 81.
66. 706 F.2d at 1359. This measure of damages rather than fair market value has some-
times been called the "substitute facilities doctrine." Generally, the substitute facilities doc-
trine applies to the condemnation of streets, alleyways, bridges, sewers, and other public
facilities for which fair market value cannot be determined. See, e.g., United States v. Streets,
Alleys & Public Ways, 531 F.2d 882, 886 (8th Cir. 1976) (streets); United States v. Certain
Property, 403 F.2d 800, 803-04 (2d Cir. 1968) (substitute facilities doctrine applies to condem-
nation of public bath and recreation buildings); Town of Clarksville v. United States, 198 F.2d
238, 244-45 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 927 (1953) (sewer); County of Sarpy v.
United States, 386 F.2d 453, 459 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (county road and bridge). "When the public
condemnee proves there is a duty to replace a condemned facility, it is entitled to the cost of
constructing a functionally equivalent substitute, whether that cost be more or less than the
market value of the facility taken." Certain Property, 403 F.2d at 803; accord United States v.
Certain Land, 346 F.2d 690, 694 (2d Cir. 1965) (market value rule abandoned when nature of
property or uses produce wide discrepancy between value to owner and price another would
pay); United States v. Board of Educ., 253 F.2d 760, 763 (4th Cir. 1958).
67. 706 F.2d at 1359. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the discounting of the amount of
replacement cost attributable to a higher quality facility is necessary to prevent a windfall to
the city. Id. at 1360.
68. 105 S. Ct. at 454, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 381-82.
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ment to relocate an entire town if it were condemned. 69 In the instant case
the Court reasoned that the substitute facilities doctrine applied in Brown, as
opposed to the traditionally recognized award of the fair market value of the
condemned property, would only make the valuation process more complex
without improving it.70 The Court concluded that the circuit court's ap-
proach may have been a circuitous method of determining the market value
of the condemned facility.7' Finding no basis for distinguishing between
condemned public property and condemned private property, the Court em-
phasized that in many cases the owner of condemned private property must
replace its condemned facility although it may have no legal obligation to do
so. 72 The Court rejected application of the substitute facilities doctrine, ex-
cept in cases such as Brown when the government actually provides the sub-
stitute facility itself, and held that in assessing a monetary award the fair
market value of the condemned property will be the controlling
consideration. 73
B. Texas Supreme Court
In Amason v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.74 the Texas Supreme Court consid-
ered the issue of whether the landowner-condemnee bears the burden of go-
ing forward with evidence at trial when the government-condemnor is
satisfied with the award of the special commissioners, but the condemnee
challenges the authority to condemn 7" and does not withdraw the commis-
sioners' award from the court registry. 76 As the court noted, once the con-
69. Id.
70., 105 S. Ct. at 456, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 386. Brown involved the government's relocation of
an entire city rather than a single lump sum monetary award for the taking.
71. Id. at 458, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 386.
72. Id. at 457, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 385. "Even though most private condemnees are not
legally obligated to replace property taken by the Government, economic circumstances often
force them to do so. When a home is condemned, for example, its owner must find another
place to live." Id. The Court also expressed some concern that the substitute facilities doc-
trine would confuse the jury. Id.
73. 105 S. Ct. at 458, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 386. Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Powell
joined in a concurring opinion, pointed out that limiting compensation to fair market value
will be inappropriate "[w]hen a local governmental entity can prove that the market value of
its property deviates significantly from the make-whole remedy intended by the Just Compen-
sation Clause and that a substitute facility must be acquired to continue to provide an essential
service .... " Id. at 459, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 387 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
74. 682 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1984).
75. The Texas Supreme Court recognized that the special commissioners are appointed
only to assess damages and then file an award pursuant to TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 21.014-
.016 (Vernon 1984) and "are powerless to decide whether the condemnor possesses the right to
condemn the property." 682 S.W.2d at 242; accord Lower Nueces River Water Supply Dist. v.
Cartwright, 160 Tex. 239, 241, 328 S.W.2d 752, 754 (1959); Pearson v. State, 159 Tex. 66, 70-
71, 315 S.W.2d 935, 936-37 (1958) (the commission's actions are purely administrative in
nature).
76. The general rule is that a withdrawl of the condemnation award from the registry of
the court will constitute a waiver of the right to challenge the condemnor's authority, or to
seek further recovery on appeal, and has the effect of estopping the condemnee from asserting
a contrary position. 682 S.W.2d at 242; see also Coastal Indus. Water Auth. v. Celanese Corp.,
592 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Tex. 1979); Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 472, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1004
(Tex. 1950); Perry v. Texas Mun. Power Agency, 667 S.W.2d 259, 262 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.). An exception to the general rule stated in Perry and Ce-
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demnee files objects, the special commissioners' award is vacated and the
landowner becomes the defendant in a cause of action to condemn his prop-
erty.77 Nevertheless, the condemnee is still responsible for service of process
on the government-condemnor, and if he fails to do so, the court reinstates
the commissioners' award. 78 Once the condemnee accomplishes service on
the condemnor the court cannot reinstate the commissioners' award, and the
burden of going forward with evidence at trial rests with the condemnor-
plaintiff.79 Because the landowner had made proper service and the con-
demnor-plaintiff had failed to go forward with evidence at trial, the Texas
Supreme Court held the dismissal of the entire condemnation proceeding
appropriate. 80
In City ofAustin v. Avenue Corp. 8 1 the appellant-city appealed an award of
damages resulting from construction work in front of the appellee's restau-
rant. The court of appeals had upheld the award on the appellee's theory of
inverse condemnation.82 The supreme court held that the partial, temporary
restriction of access to the appellee's restaurant did not constitute an inverse
condemnation entitling the appellee to damages. 83
C. Texas Courts of Appeals
The Texas courts of appeals decided several significant cases in the area of
condemnation during the Survey period. In Dyer v. Texas Electric Service
lanese Corp. occurs when the condemnee withdraws the award and on appeal seeking further
recovery accept "only that which appellee [condemnor] concedes, or is bound to concede, to be
due him under the judgment." Carle, 149 Tex. at 472, 234 S.W.2d at 1004. This exception was
at issue (and found inapplicable) in Couch v. State, 688 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1985, writ ref d n.r.e.), decided during the Survey period. In Couch the State of Texas had
taken possession of the condemnee's property following the trial court's verdict in its favor,
filed no motion for new trial, and deposited the amount of the judgment into the register of the
court, which the condemnee later withdrew. Id. at 155. The Couch majority held that the
appellant had waived its right to appeal the judgment; however, the dissent forcefully decried
the inconsistency in current law that allows a condemnee to withdraw the commissioners'
award and then appeal, but generally disallows such action at the trial court level. Id. at 156
(Burgess, J., dissenting).
77. 682 S.W.2d at 242; see Denton County v. Brammer, 361 S.W.2d 198, 200 (Tex. 1962);
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.018(b) (Vernon 1984).
78. Amason, 682 S.W.2d at 242; accord Hilburn v. Brazos Elec. Power Coop., 683 S.W.2d
58 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Interestingly, the Texas Supreme Court in
Amason and the court of appeals in Hilburn apparently interpret TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 21.018 (Vernon 1984), which reads, "the court shall cite the adverse party," as requiring the
dissatisfied condemnee to cite the condemnor. Amason, 682 S.W.2d at 242; see Hilburn, 683
S.W.2d at 60.
79. Amason, 682 S.W.2d at 242 (citing Denton County v. Brammer, 361 S.W.2d 198, 200-
01 (Tex. 1962)).
80. 682 S.W.2d at 242.
81. 704 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. 1986).
82. 685 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985), rev'd, 704 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. 1986).
The court of appeals had noted that "[i]nverse condemnation is an indirect taking of one's
property, although the governmental entity's eminent domain power has not been exercised."
Id.
83. 704 S.W.2d at 13. The court stated that in order to recover for interference of access
to property, the restriction must be (1) total but temporary, (2) partial but permanent, or




Co. 84 the appellant challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the evi-
dence establishing that the condemnation of his property for an electric
power line easement by a private utility company was for a public use as
required by the Texas Constitution.8 5 Answering affirmatively the question
of whether condemnation of private property for an electric tap line to serve
only one customer was a public use, the court of appeals cited Tenngasco
Gas Gathering Co. v. Fischer.86 In Fischer the Corpus Christi court of ap-
peals stated that "[tihe test for determining whether a given use is public is
to see if there results to the public some definite right or use in the business
or undertaking to which the property is devoted. 87 The Dyer court applied
what it conceded to be a liberal view of a public use, 88 and upheld the con-
demnation by rationalizing that the electric power line could benefit the pub-
lic by raising the land occupier's level of oil production. 89
In City of Houston v. Southern Water Corp.90 the city appealed from a
temporary injunction restraining it from pursuing the condemnation of a
subdivision's public sanitary sewer and water supply systems. In affirming
the trial court's grant of injunctive relief, the court of appeals relied upon the
well-settled rule of law that only real property, and not property of a sub-
sisting public utility associated with the business and distribution system,91
may be appropriated unless the city can provide adequate assurance that the
loss will be offset. 92 The court of appeals found no such assurance in any
statute or charter provision cited by the city of Houston and refused to dis-
solve the temporary injunction.9 3
84. 680 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, no writ).
85. Id. at 884. TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 17 requires all condemnations of private property to
be for a public use.
86. 653 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Geary & Dav-
enport, 1984 Annual Survey, supra note 61, at 472-73 (thorough discussion of Fischer case).
87. 653 S.W.2d at 475 (quoting the Texas Supreme Court in Coastal States Gas Producing
Co. v. Pate, 158 Tex. 171, 179, 309 S.W.2d 828, 833 (1958)); accord Davis v. City of Lubbock,
160 Tex. 38, 45-46, 326 S.W.2d 699, 704-06 (1959).
88. 680 S.W.2d at 885.
89. Id. Furthermore, the Dyer court stated that "[t]he mere fact that the advantage of the
use inures to a particular individual or enterprise, or group thereof, will not deprive it of its
public character." Id. at 885 (quoting West v. Whitehead, 238 S.W. 976, 978 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1922, writ refd)); see also Housing Auth. v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 158,
143 S.W.2d 79, 84 (1940); cf Borden v. Trespalacios Rice & Irrigation Co., 98 Tex. 494, 86
S.W. 11 (1905) which held as follows:
[This court is] not inclined to accept that liberal definition of the phrase "public
use" adopted by some authorities, which makes it mean no more than the public
welfare or good, and under which almost any kind of extensive business which
promotes the prosperity and comfort of the country might be aided by the power
of eminent domain.
Id. at 509, 86 S.W. at 14.
90. 678 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ dism'd).
91. Id. at 572 (quoting Lone Star Gas Co. v. City of Fort Worth, 128 Tex. 392, 401, 98
S.W.2d 799, 803 (1936) (attempt by city to condemn entire business constituting gas utility
enjoined)).
92. 678 S.W.2d at 572. The appellees alleged that the proposed condemnation would
result in damage to their business (i.e., depreciation, goodwill, etc.) for which the city was not
contemplating appropriate compensation.
93. Id. The opinion offers no guidance as to what form of statute or charter provision
would have provided the reasonable assurance required by the court. The city's appropriation
[Vol. 40
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
In City of Austin v. Avenue Corp.94 the appellant-city appealed the trial
court's award of damages resulting from construction work in front of the
appellee's restaurant. The appellee had pleaded its cause of action as one of
inverse condemnation.95 After the appellee presented evidence that it had
lost thousands of customers due to problems of access, discomfort, and noise
generated by the city's construction, the court awarded the appellee approxi-
mately $82,000 in compensatory damages. In sustaining the damage award,
the court of appeals held that an action for damages will lie even when the
city's construction does not disrupt all suitable access if the construction
does materially and substantially impair access. 96 Upon appeal to the Texas
Supreme Court,9 7 however, "material and substantial" interference with ac-
cess to one's property was limited to three situations: "a total but temporary
restriction of access; or a partial but permanent restriction of access; or a
temporary limited restriction of access brought about by an illegal activity or
one that is negligently performed or unduly delayed."'98 Because the impair-
ment of access to the appellee's restaurant was only a temporary limited
restriction caused by legal, workmanlike and timely city construction, the
court reversed the award of damages stating that such temporary obstruc-
tions are a part of city life and must be endured. 99
III. ANNEXATION
The courts of appeals decided two significant cases regarding the valida-
tion of previous annexation procedures during the Survey period. In State
ex rel. Danner v. City of Watauga'0° the Fort Worth court of appeals upheld
the constitutionality of the Validation Act, 10 1 which validates, in all re-
of the funds to be deposited in the registry of the court did not, in itself, provide reasonable
assurance that the utilities would be adequately compensated for the property condemned.
94. 685 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985), rev'd, 704 S.W.2d II (Tex. 1986).
95. "Inverse condemnation is an indirect governmental taking of one's property, although
the governmental entity's eminent domain power has not been exercised." Id. at 455.
96. Id. (citing City of Waco v. Texland Corp., 446 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. 1969) (damages
awarded to property owners for city's construction of viaduct making it difficult to park and
maneuver transport vehicles at owners' commercial establishments)). Although the court of
appeals sustained the condemnation award to the appellee, it denied the request for prejudg-
ment interest on grounds that it was unsupported by the pleadings, damages had not been
established as of a definite time, and the amount of damages sought by appellee were not
definitely determinable. 685 S.W.2d at 456. See Schoenberg v. Forrest, 253 S.W.2d 331, 334
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1952, no writ) (to establish definite liquidated claim of lost
profits plaintiff must bring forward convincing evidence).
97. 704 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. 1986).
98. Id. at 13.
99. Id. at 12 (citing L.M.S., Inc. v. Blackwell, 149 Tex. 348, 233 S.W.2d 286 (1950)).
100. 676 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
101. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 974d-28 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986). Section 4 of
this article provides:
Sec. 4 (a) The original boundary lines of each municipality covered by this
Act and any extension of those boundaries adopted before Janu-
ary 1, 1975, are validated in all respects, even though the action
adopting the original boundaries or an extension of them was not
in accordance with law.
(b) Without limiting the generality of Subsection (a) of this section, it is
expressly provided that an attempted annexation that occurred before
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spects, the incorporation of any Texas municipality and their original
boundary lines, and any extensions thereof, adopted prior to January 1,
1975, even if the original boundaries or a subsequent extension were not
lawfully adopted.'0 2 The court initially rejected the plaintiff's argument that
the legislature was without the power to enact validating legislation, noting
that "what the Legislature has the power to authorize, it has the power to
ratify."' 1 3 In addition, the court rejected the argument that the statute was
unconstitutional as a retroactive taking or impairing of property rights and
held that a property owner has no constitutional right concerning a munici-
pality's location. 104
In City of The Colony v. City of Frisco 15 the appellant appealed the ruling
of the trial court that the Validation Act validated an annexation ordinance
of the city of Frisco, Texas.' 0 6 In 1966, the city of Frisco had enacted an
ordinance for the annexation of approximately eighty-seven square miles,
although its extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ) extended only one-half mile
beyond the city limits' 0 7 The parties did not dispute that the original annex-
ation was clearly invalid under a provision in the Municipal Annexation Act
(MAA) which sanctions annexations only within a municipality's ETJ.10 8
Although the annexation itself was clearly contrary to the express provisions
of the MAA, the court of appeals held that the unambiguous language of the
validation statute superseded the otherwise invalid Frisco annexation.109
January 1, 1975, may not be held invalid because it did not comply with
the Municipal Annexation Act, as amended (Article 970a, Vernon's
Texas Civil Statutes), or any other applicable law, or because the terri-
tory the municipality attempted to annex was not contiguous or adjacent
to the then existing boundaries of the municipality, or because the mu-
nicipality was not petitioned for annexation by the owners or residents of
the annexed territory.
Id. art. 974d-28, § 4.
102. Id. The court emphasized the breadth of this language: "In other words, no matter
what the alleged factual insufficiency or alleged violation of the Municipal Annexation Act or
Article 974, the validation statute expressly addresses it in approving and validating all prior
annexations .... 676 S.W.2d at 723; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 970a (Vernon 1963
& Pam. Supp. 1986) (Municipal Annexation Act).
103. 676 S.W.2d at 724 (quoting Perkins v. State, 367 S.W.2d 140, 145 (Tex. 1963), in
which the Texas Supreme Court recognized the legislature's power to ratify the incorporation
of a town carved out of a much larger unincorporated community); cf City of Waco v. City of
McGregor, 523 S.W.2d 649, 653 (Tex. 1975) (relied upon legislature's intent in denying appli-
cation of the Validation Act to an invalid annexation of noncontinguous and nonadjacent
territory).
104. 676 S.W.2d at 724; see Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 177 (1907); Supe-
rior Oil Co. v. City of Port Arthur, 628 S.W.2d 94, 97 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1981, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 802 (1982).
105. 686 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
106. See supra note 101.
107. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 970a, § 3(A)(1) (Vernon 1963) provides a one-half
mile ETJ for cities with populations of less than 5,000.
108. Id. art. 970a, § 7(A) allows annexation only within a municipality's ETJ. See also Act
of June 14, 1985, ch. 649, § 1(a), 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4953 (Vernon) (generally requires
annexed area to be continguous to corporate limits of a city).
109. 686 S.W.2d at 381. Although it approved the application of the validating statute to
the previously invalid annexation, the court declined to rule on the question of whether the
validating statute also applied to previously invalid ordinances establishing ETJ. Id. at 382.
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In Woodruff v. City of Laredo o10 the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument
that the failure of the city of Laredo to submit an annexation proposal to a
vote of the residents within the territory that the city proposed to annex
made the ordinance void. The appellants complained that because the city
had not submitted the annexation proposal in question to the citizens within
its corporate limits, it had prevented the citizens of the annexed area from
voting on the proposal as Texas Revised Civil Statutes article 1182(a) re-
quires. I Acknowledging that the city of Laredo was a home rule city, the
court cited the well-settled rule of law that home rule cities may enact their
own laws and charters so long as they do not conflict with the general laws
of the state or the Texas Constitution. "1 2 Emphasizing that nothing in statu-
tory or case law expressly prohibited Laredo from implementing its own
charter annexation proceedings without a vote of its citizens, the court re-
jected the appellants' argument that the law requires the city to submit the
proposal to the residents of Laredo and, consequently, to the residents of the
area that the city was annexing by virtue of article 1182(a)." 13
Carpenter v. City of Austin" 14 involved the first direct challenge in the
Texas courts to the increasingly popular land use planning procedure known
as limited purpose annexation. Limited purpose annexation allows a city to
annex land for a limited purpose, such as wharfage, navigation, schools,
planning or zoning, without incurring the corresponding obligation to ex-
tend municipal services and major capital improvements to the annexed area
that the NAA requires. 115 The city of Austin has amended its city charter
110. 686 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ refd n.r.e.)
111. The plaintiffs relied upon TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1182a, §§ 1-3 (Vernon
1963), which provides that if a municipality submits a proposed annexation to the residents
within its corporate limits then it must also submit the proposal to the residents within the area
that is the subject of the proposed annexation. Section 4 of 1182(a) states that this requirement
is not mandatory for cities with populations over 100,000. The plaintiffs in Woodruff con-
tended that, by implication, an election of this sort is mandatory for cities of less than 100,000.
The plaintiffs' argument that they were entitled to vote was directly contingent upon the suc-
cess of their argument that the residents of Laredo were entitled to vote on the proposal. 686
S.W.2d at 695.
112. TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5 and TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1175(2) (Vernon 1963)
governs the creation of home rule cities.
The home rule city in exercising legislative power to annex adjacent territory is
restrained only to the extent that "no charter or any ordinance passed under
said charter shall contain any provision inconsistent with the Constitution of the
State, or of the general laws enacted by the Legislature of this State."
686 S.W.2d at 694 (quoting City of Irving v. Dallas County Flood Control Dist., 383 S.W.2d
571, 575 (Tex. 1964)).
113. 686 S.W.2d at 695. Laredo's city charter expressly permitted annexation by ordinance
alone without a vote of its citizens. See Sitton v. City of Lindale, 455 S.W.2d 939, 940 (Tex.
1970).
114. No. 371,492 (Dist. of Travis County, 33 1st Judicial Dist. of Texas, June 10, 1985). A
thorough analysis of this case may be found in Heath & Scott, Limited Purpose Annexation:
An Extension ofLand Use Planning, STATE BAR OF TEX. ENVTL. L.J. July 1985, at 1 [herein-
after cited as ENVTL L.J.].
115. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 970a, § 10 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986) requires that
the annexing city provides municipal service (e.g., utilities, police and fire protection, mainte-
nance of public facilities) to the area being annexed within 60 days of annexation. The city
must initiate a program for acquisition and construction of necessary capital improvements
(e.g. roads) within two and one-half years from the annexation.
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authorizing the use of limited purpose annexation in order to subject sur-
rounding areas undergoing tremendous development and growth to its zon-
ing and planning regulations. At the same time, the city expressly provided
for no expenditure on the annexed areas except in connection with the lim-
ited purpose for which it was annexing them.' 1 6
The central issue in Carpenter was whether the MAA allows an exemption
from its service provision requirements when a municipality utilizes the
method of limited purpose annexation. The city of Austin argued that, as a
home rule city, it had the constitutional power 1 7 to annex territory for a
limited purpose as long as the procedure did not violate or conflict with the
general laws of Texas or the Texas Constitution.'1 8 The city claimed that
MAA section 10(C) should be interpreted as providing an exemption from
the service provision requirements for limited purpose annexation. 119
In contrast, the appellants argued that the service provisions of the MAA
were applicable to limited purpose annexation and also "that the City's an-
nexations created a territory where the county was prohibited by state law
from exercising its authority, while the City was prohibited by its charter
from expending funds for services, leaving a governmental 'no-man's
land.' ",120 Initially, the court agreed with the city's interpretation that sec-
tion 10(C) of the MAA was not intended to limit the power of a city to use
limited purpose annexation.12' With regard to the latter contention, the
court held that state laws prohibiting services by counties in areas within a
city's corporate limits apply only to those areas within a city's full purpose
boundaries and, therefore, the counties were not relieved from their duty to
116. The city charter was amended to provide that
In addition to the power to annex additional territory for all purposes, the City
shall have the power, by ordinance, to fix, alter and extend the corporate bound-
aries of the City for limited purposes of "Planning and Zoning" and "Sanitation
and Health Protection".... The City shall have no power to levy any tax for
municipal purposes on either the property or the inhabitants of territory an-
nexed for limited ... purposes, and no funds.., shall be spent in such territory
except . . . for the accomplishment of the limited purpose . . . for which the
territory is annexed.
Austin, Texas, Charter, art. 1, § 7 (1981). The City of Austin contended that limited purpose
annexation was the only method available to prevent the burdensome development in the areas
outside Austin that was damaging its internal water supply and other resources. The city
argued that it could not possibly meet the timing requirements of the MAA with respect to full
municipal services associated with full purpose annexation. See supra note 115.
117. TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5 grants home rule cities the power of self-government. See
supra note 112.
118. See City of Irving v. Dallas County Flood Control Dist., 383 S.W.2d 571, 575 (Tex.
1964); Woodruff v. City of Laredo, 686 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no
writ); see supra note 112.
119. "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit or repeal home-rule charter provi-
sions providing for annexation for limited purposes other than ad valorem taxation." TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 970a, § 10(C) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986).
120. ENVTL. L.J., supra note 114, at 3; see, e.g., TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 235la-5,
-6 (Vernon 1971 & Supp. 1986). The plaintiffs also contended that limited purpose annexation
violated § 11 of the MAA, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 970a, § 11 (Vernon Pam. Supp.
1986), which obligated the annexing authority to assume all debts of a Water Control and
Improvement District. The city's charter expressly prohibited such assumption.
121. ENVTL. L.J., supra note 114, at 4.
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provide services that the city did not provide to such areas. 122 Finally, the
court rejected the plaintiffs' last contention that the city charter provision
limiting the voting right of residents within the limited annexation area to
city council and charter amendment elections was unconstitutional, and held
that the substantially lesser degree of regulation to which such citizens were
subject rationally justified limited voting privileges. 123
Interestingly, the legislature amended the MAA section that authorized
limited purpose annexation 124 the day before the Carpenter case went to trial
to prohibit expressly the addition of limited purpose annexation provisions
to city charters for a two-year period. 125 Accordingly, the issue of limited
purpose annexation is certain to be a subject of heated debate in the next two
legislative sessions.
IV. TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS
The courts of appeals decided several significant taxation cases during the
Survey period. In Charles Schreiner Bank v. Kerrville Independent School
District12 6 several banks and their shareholders sought an injunction against
the school district and the city alleging that the taxing authorities had failed
to exclude tax-exempt federal government obligations in determining the
taxable value of shares of stock in the banks. The banks argued that the
resulting assessment based on that determination was illegal. 127 In comput-
ing the taxable value of the banks' stock, the taxing authorities had used the
equity capital formula, which simply takes the total amount of a bank's capi-
tal assets minus its liabilities and the assessed value of its real estate holdings
and divides that figure by the number of outstanding shares of the bank.
The trial court acknowledged that this method of assessment was illegal, but
denied the plaintiffs the relief sought because they failed to show that they
had suffered substantial injury from the illegal assessment as required by
City of Arlington v. Cannon.128
122. See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 2351a-6, 2352 (Vernon 1971 & Supp.
1986) (county authority to tax and to organize rural fire prevention districts); id. art. 6702-1
(Vernon Supp. 1986) (County Road and Bridge Act).
123. ENVTL. L.J., supra note 114, at 4.
124. See supra note 119.
125. Act of June 14, 1985, ch. 649, § 2(C)(2), 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4954 (Vernon).
126. 683 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
127. 31 U.S.C. § 3124 (1982) provides that federal obligations shall be exempt from "each
form of [state or local] taxation that would require the obligation, the interest on the obliga-
tion, or both, to be considered in computing a tax .... " Id. The Supreme Court has held that
the failure of the taxing authorities to deduct from the "equity capital formula" the amount of
federal obligations held by a bank will render any resulting assessment illegal in violation of
this statute. See American Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County, 463 U.S. 855, 860 (1983). For
additional discussion of the same issue raised in the instant case, see Geary, Davenport & Jobe,
1985 Annual Survey, supra note 1, at 589-90 (discussing the companion case of American Bank
& Trust Co. v. Dallas County, 679 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ)).
128. 153 Tex. 566, 570-71, 271 S.W.2d 414, 417 (1954) (taxpayer not entitled to injunctive
relief because he had not shown he would suffer substantial injury as a result of a tax scheme
that had been held fundamentally erroneous, arbitrary, and illegal). The court in American
Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County, 679 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ), re-
jected the taxpayers' request for injunctive relief from collection of an assessment determined
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In overruling the trial court's denial of injunctive relief, the appeals court
in Charles Schreiner Bank emphasized that the substantial injury require-
ment stated in Cannon effectively allows taxation of exempt property unless
the tax imposed thereon is substantial.1 29 The court chastised the Texas ju-
diciary for "adjusting the judicial blindfold" in order to justify unlawful tax-
ing schemes by taxing agencies. ' 30
The appellees also contended, alternatively, that the court should deny the
appellants' request for injunctive relief because they filed suit after the assess-
ment board had certified the tax rolls and, thus, the request was untimely. 1 3'
The court rejected this argument on grounds that it may not be possible to
obtain a hearing in front of the Board of Equalization prior to approval of
the tax rolls and, furthermore, to require the plaintiffs to challenge the tax-
ing authority's methods before the actual assessment is made would require
them to ignore the presumption that public authorities act lawfully.' 32
In Smith v. City of Houston133 the Houston court of appeals held that a
paving assessment was unconstitutional and void 134 because it was applied
uniformly without regard to the special benefits requirement of section 7 of
Texas Revised Civil Statutes article 1 105b. 135 The appellants argued that the
by the Supreme Court of the United States to be illegal on the strength of the Texas Supreme
Court's holding in Cannon. Id. at 575.
129. 683 S.W.2d at 470. In addition, the court pointed out that what may be an insubstan-
tial amount as to one taxpayer may amount to quite a substantial sum, in the aggregate, when
collected from all parties being taxed under the illegal assessment. Id. at 470-71. This circum-
stance may make a class action suit appropriate for cases premised on the erroneous use of the
equity capital formula.
130. Id. at 471. The court cited the example of punishing those taxpayers who do not act
diligently and timely in challenging an illegal taxation scheme as one possible justification for
the substantial injury requirement. See Cannon, 153 Tex. at 571-72, 271 S.W.2d at 416-17
(substantial injury requirement was imposed as penalty taxpayer had to pay for sitting idly by
while taxing authorities put into effect a discriminatory plan of taxation).
131. 683 S.W.2d at 471.
132. Id. at 472. A tax plan is not actually formulated until the governing body of the city
or school district determines the amount of money required to finance its operations and sets a
tax rate in reliance upon the assessment rolls. Thus, "[iut should be sufficient if the suit is filed
before the governing body sets the tax rate .... Id. The court in Charles Schreiner seems to
imply that after that time, the substantial injury requirement may be defensible. The overall
tenor of the opinion suggests, however, that anytime a party proves that the assessment rolls
involve the taxation of exempt property, the San Antonio court would apparently refuse to
reward "the wrongdoer" by imposing on the taxpayer the burden of proving substantial injury.
Id. at 470-72.
133. 693 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
134. See Haynes v. City of Abilene, 659 S.W.2d 638, 641 (Tex. 1983) (assessments greater
than benefits conferred renders ordinance in violation of Texas Constitution); City of Houston
v. Alnoa G. Corp., 638 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (failure to include special benefits analysis in calculation rendered assessment constitu-
tionally void as arbitrary and capricious); TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 17 (prohibits taking of private
property for public use without just compensation).
135. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1105b, § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1986) provides (emphasis
added):
The part of the cost of improvements on each portion of highway ordered im-
proved which may be assessed against abutting property and owners thereof
shall be apportioned among the parcels of abutting property and owners thereof,
in accordance with the Front Foot Plan or Rule provided that ifthe application of
this rule would, in the opinion of the Governing Body, in particular cases, result in
injustice or inequality, it shall be the duty of said Body to apportion and assess
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city ordinance providing that "each front foot of an abutting owner's lots
may be assessed a portion of the total cost of improvements which is equal to
the portion of the assessment levied against each front foot of property of
other abutting owners along the improved segment of the road" violated the
provisions of article 1105b. 136 The city ordinance had expressly failed to
assess costs with regard to any special benefits as required by article 1105b,
and therefore, the assessment was constitutionally impermissible.137 Ac-
cordingly, because the ordinance in question assessed property owners
equally and without imposing heavier burdens on property owners receiving
special benefits, it was held unconstitutional and void.1 38 In addition, the
court overruled the trial court's holding that the plaintiffs' suit was barred
by the fifteen-day statutory time period for appeal of an assessment,1 39 and
held that because the ordinance in question was constitutionally void, the
fifteen-day limit was irrelevant and inapplicable. 140
In Arnold v. Crockett Independent School District 4 1 a landowner appealed
from the trial court's judgment in favor of the school district for delinquent
property taxes. On motion for rehearing, the court first corrected its own
prior error in assessing court costs against the school district, which is
clearly contrary to section 3 3.49(a) of the Texas Tax Code, 14 2 and then con-
sidered the primary issue of whether the property assessed had been properly
said costs in such proportion as it may deem just and equitable, having in view the
special benefits in enhanced value to be received by such parcels of property and
owners thereof, the equities of such owners, and the adjustment of such appor-
tionment so as to produce a substantial equality of benefits received and burdens
imposed. Any parcel of land abutting the highway proposed for assessment is
subject, in its entirety as a parcel, to the assessment when the assessment is
imposed by ordinance, irrespective of subdivision or partial sale after the date of
mailing of the notice if the city has delivered to the county clerk for recording a
notice of the proposed assessment that describes each such abutting parcel in the
notice or by reference.
The front foot plan essentially calculates the total cost of the improvements and divides that
cost by the sum total of each foot of land abutting the roadway. Each owner is then assessed
based on the amount of land he owns that abuts the improved road.
136. 693 S.W.2d at 754 (quoting Foxworth-Galbraith Lumber Co. v. Realty Trust Co., 110
S.W.2d 1164, 1167 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1937, writ dism'd)).
137. 693 S.W.2d at 755. In City of Houston v. Alnoa G. Corp., 638 S.W.2d 515 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the same ordinance was declared arbitrary,
capricious, and illegal on the same grounds as in Smith, but only as to the complaining land-
owner in that case. Id. at 517. In Smith, the court held that the ordinance could not properly
be applied to any landowner. 693 S.W.2d at 755.
138. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1105b, § 9 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (prescribes the
15-day limit for appeal of an assessment).
139. 693 S.W.2d at 755; see Elmendorf v. City of San Antonio, 242 S.W. 185, 188 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1922, judgment adopted). The court in Smith, 693 S.W.2d at 755, also ques-
tioned the constitutionality of the time limit as perhaps unreasonable in light of the court of
appeals decision in Fitts v. City of Beaumont, 688 S.W.2d 182, 184-85 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1985, writ refd n.r.e.), discussed infra at notes 234-39 and accompanying text.
140. 693 S.W.2d at 755.
141. 688 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1985, no writ).
142. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.49(a) (Vernon 1982) states: "Except as provided by Sub-
section (b) of this section, a taxing unit is not liable in a suit to collect taxes for court costs...
and may not be required to post security for the costs." An independent school district is




valued for purposes of taxation. The court noted the general rule that when
the taxing authority offers no evidence as to value of the property, the tax-
payer bears the heavy burden of establishing that the value assessed on each
tract was exhorbitant and, therefore, unreasonable and confiscatory, thereby
establishing that fraud attended the assessments. 143 The Arnold court, how-
ever, held that the taxpayer had only to show a gross difference between the
assessed value and the market value'44 of the subject property in order to
establish the requisite element of fraud.
In reviewing the record, the court of appeals noted that the trial court,
with one exception, adopted values for the subject property almost identical
to the district's assessment values. 14 5 The only evidence contrary to the
district's assessment consisted of the much lower values testified to by the
landowner's qualified expert appraiser. Having concluded that the trial
court's findings of market value were contrary to the great weight and pre-
ponderance of the evidence, 14 6 the court of appeals remanded to the trial
court for a determination of whether the assessed valuations were grossly
excessive. 147
In Board of Appraisal Review v. Protestant Episcopal Church Council148
the appellees had successfully set aside a board order that denied the dio-
cese's application for exemption from ad valorem taxation with respect to
certain undeveloped land surrounding the school it owned and operated. All
buildings and other improvements associated with the school were located
exclusively on a 207-acre portion of a larger 392-acre tract of land owned by
the diocese. The controversy dealt with the appraisal board's denial of tax
exempt status to the remaining 185 acres, which it contended the diocese
was not operating exclusively in connection with the school. 149 The case
hinged on the court's interpretation of Texas statutes that exempt school
buildings reasonably necessary for the operation of the school' 50 from ad
valorem taxation and define what land is included within the definition of a
143. 688 S.W.2d at 886.
144. A gross difference must be shown "because a difference in value which reflects a mere
difference of opinion or an honest mistake in judgment on the part of the Board of Equaliza-
tion as to the true value will not justify a court in striking down the Board's assessments." Id.
(citing State v. Whittenburg, 153 Tex. 205, 210, 265 S.W.2d 569, 573 (1954)).
145. 688 S.W.2d at 886.
146. Id. at 887.
147. Id. Remanding the case to the trial court, the court of appeals did not mention any
specific error committed by the trial court but simply directed it to make another attempt at
valuation. Cf Stedman v. Georgetown Say. & Loan Ass'n, 595 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex. 1979)
(writing on whether the evidence supported the findings of the lower courts, the Texas
Supreme Court held it to be fundamental that the fact findings be upheld if more than a scin-
tilla of evidence supported them).
148. 676 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ dism'd).
149. Id. at 618. The Board drew the dividing line between these two portions of the tract
solely in relation to the improvements thereon. The line bore no relationship to any existing or
former ownership boundaries.
150. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.21(a)(3) (Vernon 1982) provides: "(a) A person is enti-
tled to an exemption from taxation of the buildings and tangible personal property that he
owns and that are used for a school that is qualified ... if: . . . (3) the buildings and tangible
personal property are reasonably necessary for the operation of the school."
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building. 151 The diocese presented evidence at trial that the surrounding 185
acres provided a buffer zone from the outside commercial community neces-
sary to implement and foster the autonomous and individual spirit that was
part of the church's teachings and that the diocese also used the land to take
advantage of the vast rural setting for outdoor class instructions and athlet-
ics. 152 The diocese argued that the statutory term "necessary" should en-
compass all land required to implement their unique educational
philosophy. 153 Although the court found persuasive the board's argument
that the appellee's interpretation was far too broad and might allow schools
unilaterally to adopt educational philosophies that enable them to avoid tax-
ation, it nevertheless found the church's evidence compelling and granted
the exemption. 154 In addition, the court recognized that the goals of both
private and public education go far beyond mere formal instruction and indi-
vidual education styles may properly be considered in determining what
lands are " 'reasonably necessary' for the operation of the school." 155
In Ripley v. Stephens156 the court of appeals reversed the decision of the
district court and held that the Stephenses did not qualify for the $10,000
statutory homestead exemption from ad valorem school taxation for persons
over sixty-five years of age. 157 The parties agreed that, on the date of the
assessment, the husband was under age sixty-five and the wife was over age
sixty-five and that the requested exemption was based upon the wife's age.
Accordingly, the court of appeals disallowed the exemption because the
house was the separate property of the under-aged husband and the statute
plainly states that the exemption applies only to homesteads "owned by any
person age 65 years or older."158 Thus, even though the Stephenses' home
might have qualified as a homstead for other constitutional purposes, 59 the
property did not qualify for this exemption from taxation.
151. Id. § 11.21(e) provides: "In this section, 'building' includes the land that is reasonably
necessary for use of, access to, and ornamentation of the building."
152. 676 S.W.2d at 621.
153. The diocese contended that a crucial element of its teaching and faith was in the area
of self-government and independence, which could only be taught effectively if the school were
isolated from the outside commercial community. Id. 621-22 n.2.
154. Id. at 622. The board relied upon the case of St. Edwards' College v. Morris, 82 Tex.
1, 5, 17 S.W. 512, 513 (1891), which denied tax exempt status to land used to grow produce
and stock for the boarding school and was contiguous with that used exclusively for school
purposes. The court reasoned, however, that St. Edwards' seemed to focus more upon whether
the land was used exclusively for school purposes rather than upon the concept of necessity.
676 S.W.2d at 620.
155. 676 S.W.2d at 622-23. The court listed certain goals of public education recognized in
the State of Texas, including instruction in the democratic process and self-government that do
not directly relate to formal instruction but that are, nevertheless, recognized as legitimate.
Such goals included instilling behavior patterns that would make 'students responsible mem-
bers of society' and developing the skills necessary to creative and responsible use of leisure
time. Id.
156. 686 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
157. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.13(c) (Vernon 1982), enacted pursuant to TEX. CONST.
art. VIII, § 1-a, provides an exemption from ad valorem school taxation for $10,000 of the
market value of a residential homestead owned by any person age 65 or older.
158. 686 S.W.2d at 758 (emphasis by the court).
159. E.g., exemption from forced sale and partition under TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
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V. ELECTED OFFICIALS AND ELECTIONS
A. Federal Courts
The federal courts decided two cases during the Survey period that in-
volved challenges to at-large voting 160 in Texas school board elections. In
McCarty v. Henson16 1 the Fifth Circuit rejected the claim of a group of black
voters that the at-large system diluted their vote in violation of the four-
teenth and fifteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. 162 In
denying the plaintiffs' relief on their constitutional claims, the court held
that the plaintiffs' failure to show that the city had implemented and main-
tained the at-large system with a discriminatory motive, 163 or that the sys-
tem had a discriminatory impact on the electoral process, could not support
a claim that the election scheme was unconstitutional. 164 Unable to find a
discriminatory motive or uncover evidence of discriminatory impact such as
hindrance to the candidacy of black persons for the board or unresponsive-
ness by the school board to black persons, the court of appeals upheld the
election scheme as lacking both discriminatory intent and impact.1 65
160. An at-large system is a system by which all voters in the city elect a certain number of
members to the city council without regard to the district in which the voter resides. Both
McCarty v. Henson, 749 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1984) (discussed infra notes 161-65) and Sierra v.
El Paso Indep. School Dist., 591 F. Supp. 802 (W.D. Tex. 1984) (discussed infra notes 166-78),
involved allegations that this procedure had the effect of diluting the minority vote from dis-
tricts that were predominantly occupied by minorities.
161. 749 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1984).
162. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV provides in part: "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States .... " Id.
amend. XV provides in part: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude."
163. 749 F.2d at 1137. The United States Supreme Court has recently held that a plaintiff
must show that the governing body enacting the challenged legislation acted with a discrimina-
tory purpose in order to support a finding of unconstitutional voting dilution under either the
14th or 15th amendments to the U.S. Constitution. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S 613, 618-19
(1982); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980); see also Personnel Admin. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 275-76 (1979) (disproportionate impact of civil service exam requirement will
not support equal protection claim without showing of discriminatory motive); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976) (discriminatory result of language test insufficient to establish
equal protection violation in absence of discriminatory motive); Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1977) (denial of rezoning for low-income
housing did not involve racial discrimination, but rather protection of land values); cf Voting
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1983), as amended (objective indicia showing that the election
scheme has discriminatory impact may establish claim of violation of Voting Rights Act).
164. 749 F.2d at 1137. Both discriminatory intent and discriminatory impact must be
proven to establish a denial of constitutional rights under the 14th or 15th amendments. Zim-
mer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), aff'd on other grounds sub
nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (objective criteria could
be used to show intent to discriminate); accord Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618-19 (1982);
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980).
165. Having failed to show any denial or abridgement of their right to vote (no discrimina-
tory impact), the McCarty court also rejected plaintiffs' claim that the election scheme violated
the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1983), which provides that a state or political subdi-
vision cannot deny, on account of race or color, a citizen's right to vote. Such a denial occurs
when certain classes have less opportunity than other citizens to elect representatives of their
choice. That discriminatory intent does not have to be shown to establish a violation of the
Voting Rights Act is well settled. See Jones v. City of Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364, 373-75 (5th Cir.
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In a similar voting dilution case, the plaintiffs brought a class action suit
on behalf of all Mexican-American voters residing in the El Paso Independ-
ent School District eligible to vote for members of the district's board of
trustees. In Sierra v. El Paso Independent School District166 the plaintiffs
alleged that the ordinance in question violated the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution and the Voting Rights Act.1 67
The plaintiffs alleged that the at-large, by-place, majority runoff, nonpartisan
election system unconstitutionally diluted the voting strength of Mexican-
Americans and made it difficult for them to elect representatives of their
choice to the school board. 168 With respect to the plaintiffs' constitutional
challenge, the court held that, as in McCarty, the failure to present evidence
that any feature of the then-existing election system had been enacted with
discriminatory intent was fatal to the plaintiffs' cause of action.' 69
With respect to the plaintiffs' alternative challenge that the scheme vio-
lated the Voting Rights Act, the district court relied upon the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Jones v. City of Lubbock.170 In Jones the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the constitutionality of the 1983 amendment to section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, which provided that objective criteria could be used to show
that a challenged election scheme had a discriminatory impact, and further,
held that it was unnecessary to show a discriminatory motive for a violation
of the Voting Rights Act. 17 1 In analyzing certain objective factors enumer-
ated in the legislative history to the 1983 amendment, 72 the Sierra court
considered whether the plaintiffs had demonstrated that the El Paso election
system had the discriminatory result required to establish a violation of the
Voting Rights Act. First, the court determined that the repealed poll tax,
together with, until recently, the printing of ballots exclusively in English
constituted past discriminatory practices that continued to contribute to the
lower voting rates of Mexican-Americans when compared to Anglo vot-
1984) (upholding constitutionality of 1982 amendment to Voting Rights Act and rejecting
argument that a showing of subjective discriminatory intent is required to establish a violation
of its provisions).
166. 591 F. Supp. 802 (W.D. Tex. 1984).
167. See supra notes 162-63.
168. 591 F. Supp. at 804. A "by-place" system elects members to the board by numbered
positions. Id. Over 50% of those who resided within the El Paso Independent School District
were Mexican-Americans and 70% of the students enrolled in district schools were Mexican-
Americans, but only 43% of the registered voters within the district were Mexican-Americans.
169. Id. at 805.
170. 727 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1984), discussed in Geary, Davenport & Jobe, 1985 Annual
Survey, supra note 1, at 594.
171. 727 F.2d at 373-75 (1983 amendment to Voting Rights Act was legitimate exercise of
congressional power). Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was enacted to overrule the United
States Supreme Court's opinion in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), which had
overruled the Fifth Circuit's decision in Zimmer v. McKeithan, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir.
1973) (en banc), affid on other grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parrish School Bd. v. Marshall,
424 U.S. 636 (1976) (allowing objective criteria to establish a discriminatory motive in voting
legislation). In Zimmer the Fifth Circuit had substituted the "results test," which required
only objective criteria showing that the legislation had a discriminatory impact, for the prior
requirement that discriminatory purpose or intent be shown in order to constitute a violation
of the Voting Rights Act. 485 F.2d at 1304-05.
172. 591 F. Supp. at 806-07.
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ers. 173 Furthermore, based on expert testimony, the court concluded that
the voting pattern in the district's school board elections had a high degree
of racial polarization and that the ethnicity of a candidate was a very impor-
tant consideration with respect to voter preference.174 Taking into account
the totality of facts and circumstances surrounding the challenged voting
scheme, 175 the district court concluded that the election system for the El
Paso School Board of Trustees had resulted in "a denial or abridgment of
the right" 176 of Mexican-Americans to vote as prohibited by the Voting
Rights Act. 177 Accordingly, the court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs
and ordered the defendants to implement a single-member district system of
voting in place of the at-large scheme.1 78
B. Texas Courts of Appeals
In Miller v. Lesher179 the relator-plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus °80 to
compel the respondent-judge to grant his motion to set a supersedeas bond
pending the outcome of a contested election. 181 The voters had elected the
relator in Miller sheriff of Brazos County, but his opponent brought a subse-
quent election contest that resulted in the judge's declaring the election void.
The judge had refused to allow Miller, the newly elected sheriff, to file a
supersedeas bond, which would have suspended the judgment, stating that
"the interest of justice will be best served if the judgment of this Court is not
suspended during an appeal of the cause. .... -182 Instead, the judge signed
an order granting the contestant's motion to post a bond under Texas Rule
of Civil Procedure 364(0, which allows a plaintiff, as opposed to a defend-
ant, to post a bond and prevent the judgment from being suspended. 183 The
173. Id. at 807.
174. Id. at 807-08. In addition, the court determined that the vast size of the district, its
large population, staggered terms for trustees, filing by numbered positions, majority runoff,
and the absence of any subdistrict residency requirement were all elements of the existing
election system that enhanced the opportunity for discrimination. Id.
175. "The Voting Rights Act requires that the totality of the circumstances be considered
in determining whether a particular system of electing public officials results in the denial to a
particular class of citizens of equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice." Id. at 811.
176. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1983).
177. 591 F. Supp. at 812.
178. Id.
179. 694 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
180. The three requisite elements of mandamus relief are: (1) a legal duty to perform a
nondiscretionary act; (2) a demand for performance of the nondiscretionary act; and (3) a
refusal to perform the nondiscretionary act after demand. Stoner v. Massey, 586 S.W.2d 843,
846 (Tex. 1979); Bantuelle v. Renfroe, 620 S.W.2d 635, 639 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no
writ).
181. A supersedeas bond filed with the registry of the court pursuant to TEX. R. Civ. P.
364(a) has the general effect of suspending a judgment and maintaining the status quo. The
trial judge in Miller refused to allow the newly elected sheriff to post a supersedeas bond under
rule 364(a), but granted the contestant's motion for bond under rule 364(f). See infla note 183.
182. 694 S.W.2d at 195.
183. TEX. R. Civ. P. 364(f) provides:
When the judgment is for other than money or property or foreclosure, the bond
or deposit shall be in such amount to be fixed by the said court below as will
secure the plaintiff in judgment in any loss or damage occasioned by the delay
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court of appeals held that each party has the right to an opportunity to su-
persede the judgment, 184 and that the trial court's grant of the bond under
rule 364(f) cannot be used to usurp the jurisdiction of the appeals court. 185
The court reasoned that the trial court had abused its discretion by refusing
to suspend the judgment because the effect of such refusal is to remove the
sheriff from office pending a new election. The Texas Election Code does not
sanction this temporary removal from office and, furthermore, this removal
prevents the party appealing the outcome of the election contest from exer-
cising his right to appeal that decision. 186
VI. OPEN MEETINGS ACT
The Texas courts of appeals decided two significant cases during the Sur-
vey period interpreting provisions of the Open Meetings Act. 187 In Thorn-
ton v. Smith County1 8 8 individuals owning land adjacent to a county road
that had been partially deeded by the Smith County commissioners court to
a private pipeline corporation sought a declaratory judgment cancelling the
deed and an injunction prohibiting the county from closing the road. 189 The
critical issue in Thornton was whether the posting of public notice of the
commissioners court meeting, which was being held to vote on the closing of
the road in question, contravened section 3(A) of the Act requiring that such
notice be "posted in a place readily accessible to the general public at all
times for at least 72 hours preceding the ... meeting."1 90 The notice was
on appeal, but the court may decline to permit the judgment to be suspended on
filing by the plaintiff of a bond or deposit to be fixed by the court in such an
amount as will secure the defendant in any loss or damage occasioned by any
relief granted if it is determined on final disposition that such relief was
improper.
184. 694 S.W.2d at 195. The court of appeals held that the trial court has no jurisdiction to
deny a plaintiff's right to supersede a judgment by posting a bond under rule 364(a). Id.; see
Houtchens v. Mercer, 119 Tex. 244, 248, 27 S.W.2d 795, 796 (1930); Alvarez v. Laughlin, 362
S.W.2d 915, 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1962, no writ).
185. 694 S.W.2d at 195.
186. The court stated:
There is no provision in the Election Code or in Texas case law that provides for
the removal of an elected official from office following an election contest where
the election is declared void. For that period of time between the judgment that
the election was void and the time a new election is held, the previously elected
official should continue to hold office.
Id.
187. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, §§ 1-5 (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1985).
188. 690 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
189. The county sought to close the portion of the road that had been deeded to the pipe-
line corporation.
190. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 3A(h) (Vernon Supp. 1986) provides that
notice of a meeting that is subject to its provisions, other than an emergency meeting, must be
posted for at least 72 hours preceding the scheduled time of the meeting. The history of the
notice requirement under the Act is worth noting. The original Act simply required three
days' notice preceding the day of a meeting. Id. § 3A() (Vernon 1970). In 1975 the notice
provision was made more specific by requiring 72 hours. Act of 1975, ch. 367, § 1, 1975 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. 968 (Vernon). Then, in 1981, the Amarillo court of appeals, in Lipscomb
Indep. School Dist. v. County School Trustees, 498 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1973, writ refd n.r.e.), held that notice posted for 72 hours preceding a meeting was in sub-
stantial compliance with § 3A(h) even when the courthouse where the notice was posted re-
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posted at 9:00 a.m. on the Friday preceding the 10:00 a.m. Monday morning
meeting. Smith County contended that evidence presented at trial showing
that the area of the courthouse where notice was posted was accessible to the
public through the sheriff's office over the weekend established that the no-
tice posted was in substantial compliance with the provisions of the Act.191
Although the court was cognizant of the precedent that holds substantial
compliance with the Act sufficient, 192 it concluded that the Texas Legisla-
ture's continuing amendments to the notice requirements of section 3(A) of
the Act193 left no room for judicial interpretation. 194 Accordingly, the court
held that the notice was not posted in a place readily accessible to the public
and, therefore, the county violated section 3(A) of the Act. 195
In Board of Trustees v. Cox Enterprises, Inc. 196 the Texarkana court of
appeals held that members of the news media who had been expressly pro-
vided the right to bring actions by mandamus or injunction to prevent a
violation of the Open Meetings Act could also seek declaratory relief for a
violation of the Act. 197 The principal issues in Cox Enterprises involved the
interpretation of key provisions of the Act that distinguish between local
government action that must occur in sessions open to the public and action
that may be transacted in closed executive sessions. 198
mained locked for at least two-thirds of the 72 hours. Id. at 366-67. The attorney general
criticized the Lipscomb decision and predicted that the Texas Supreme Court would hold
otherwise if squarely confronted with the Lipscomb notice question. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen.
No. H-419 (1974). Then, in 1981, the legislature apparently rejected the substantial compli-
ance doctrine set forth in Lipscomb and amended the Act to require that notices be "posted in
a place readily accessible to the general public at all times for at least 72 hours preceding the
scheduled time of the meeting .... " TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 3A(h)
(Vernon Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
191. 690 S.W.2d at 952.
192. See, e.g., McConnell v. Alamo Heights Indep. School Dist., 576 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ refd n.r.e.); Santos v. Guerro, 570 S.W.2d 437, 440 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Stelzer v. Huddleston, 526 S.W.2d 710, 713
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ dism'd); Lipscomb Indep. School Dist. v. County School
Trustees, 498 S.W.2d 364, 367 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Toyah In-
dep. School Dist. v. Pecos-Barstow Indep. School Dist., 466 S.W.2d 377, 380 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1971, no writ); cf Cameron County Good Gov't League v. Ramon, 619
S.W.2d 224, 231 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (in dictum court states
that literal, not substantial, compliance is required).
193. See supra note 190.
194. 690 S.W.2d at 953.
195. Id. The decision in Thornton is the first in Texas expressly to overrule the substantial
compliance doctrine and hold that literal compliance with the notice requirements of the Act
is required.
196. 679 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1984, writ granted).
197. Id. at 88. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1986) pro-
vides that "any interested person, including bona fide members of the news media" has stand-
ing to sue for violations of the Act (emphasis added). In addition, the Cox Enterprises court
held that the news media's standing to bring such actions is not dependent upon a showing of
special interest apart from that of the general public. 679 S.W.2d at 88.
198. Section 2(1) of the Act provides:
Whenever any deliberations or any portion of a meeting are closed to the public
as permitted by this Act, no final action, decision, or vote with regard to any
matter considered in the closed meeting shall be made except in a meeting which




Section 2(l) of the Act provides that "no final action, decision, or vote"
shall take place except in a meeting open to the public in accordance with
the Act. 199 The Austin School District Board of Trustees argued that pre-
liminary decisions can be made in private executive session as long as the
final vote or report is made or disclosed in a public meeting. In emphasizing
the legislative policy to allow citizens to participate in the decision-making
process before a final action is taken, the court chose to ignore the semantics
of the school board's proposal and held that the appellant had violated the
Act by conducting a private straw vote to determine support among the
members of the school board for a particular candidate for president. 2°° The
court reasoned that when the school board took a split straw vote and subse-
quently announced in a public meeting a unanimous vote, it violated the
spirit and letter of the Act by misleadingly allowing board members to ap-
pear unanimous. 20 1 The court stressed that its decision was not intended to
prevent debate or expression of opinion in a closed executive session.
20 2
When, however, expression of opinion crosses the line between debate and
the formation of a clear consensus on an issue, the court stated, the Act is
violated.20 3 In contrast to Thornton, the court in Cox Enterprises held that
the appellant's posting of a notice setting forth the general terms and subject
matter of executive session meetings was in substantial compliance with the
notice provisions of the Act and, consequently, decisions made in those
closed sessions were not voidable.20 4
VII. TORT LIABILITY
A. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
In Grandstaff v. City of Borger20 5 the plaintiff brought a wrongful death
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 2(1) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
199. Id.
200. 679 S.W.2d at 89. The court expressly acknowledged the difficulty of determining
when a final decision has been made in private but later reported in public.
We recognize that enforcement of the provision as here interpreted may be diffi-
cult. A group could defeat the purpose of the Act by expressing their opinions
in the private session and then confirming the majority position by unanimous
vote in the open meeting. Difficulty of enforcement, however, is not a proper
canon for interpretation of a statute as long as the meaning of the legislature can
be ascertained. Moreover, such a practice can usually be detected and brought
to light.
Id. at 89 n.4.
201. Id. The court also held that the appellants' decision in executive session to hire an
independent consultant should have been made in public. Id. at 91; cf TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 6252-17, § 2(g) (Vernon Supp. 1986), which provides that decisions with respect to
the hiring of employees, as opposed to independent contractors, may take place in executive
session.
202. 679 S.W.2d at 89.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 91-92. In contrast to the particular notice requirements for open sessions or
meetings, the notice requirements for closed sessions are less stringent. See TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 3A(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (notice content requirements); see also
supra note 190.
205. 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985).
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action and claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983,206 alleging a constitutional
violation of the plaintiff's civil rights against the city of Borger and several of
its individual police officers after the officers shot and killed an innocent man
whom they believed to be a fleeing fugitive. The jury found that the officers
in question had killed an innocent citizen without justification, had acted in
conscious disregard of a substantial risk, and had used deadly force in a
wanton, malicious, and oppressive manner. The court first acknowledged
that these findings were the basis for holding the defendants liable for wrong-
ful death and violation of the plaintiff's civil rights. 20 7 Cognizant of the
city's governmental immunity from the wrongful death claim,208 the court
then stated that the liability of the city for the reckless acts of the police
officers depended upon the scope of section 1983: "There is no respondeat
superior liability of a municipality for the negligence, gross or ordinary, of
an officer. There must be (1) a policy (2) of the city's policymaker (3) that
caused (4) the plaintiff to be subject to a deprivation of constitutional
right. ' 20 9 Having established a constitutional deprivation and finding that
the city police chief was the sole policymaker, the remaining inquiry for the
court was whether some policy of the police chief had caused the death in
question. 2 10
206. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Section 1983 has been interpreted to allow private citizens to sue states and local governing
bodies for deprivation of their constitutional rights. The United States Supreme Court held in
Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), that local governing bodies can be
sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief when the alleged
unconstitutional action "implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or
decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." Id. at 690.
207. 767 F.2d at 167. "[T]he Fourteenth Amendment protection against deprivation of life
without due process of law is violated when police officers using deadly force, in conscious
disregard of substantial risk of harm to innocent parties, kill an innocent third party." Id.
(emphasis by the court); see Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1700, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1, 8
(1985) ("fundamental interest in [one's] own life need not be elaborated upon").
208. 767 F.2d at 168. A state or local government cannot be sued without its consent.
Hansen v. Blackmon, 169 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1942), aft'd, 140 Tex.
536, 169 S.W.2d 962 (1943). "Section 1983 imposes liability for violation of rights protected
by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law." 767 F.2d at
172 (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979)). Accordingly, the circuit court in
Grandstaff overturned the lower court's award of damages against the city based on plaintiff's
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress because such award was predicated on a
state common law tort. 767 F.2d at 172. But see TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19
(Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1985), commonly known as the Texas Tort Claims Act, which provides
a governmental waiver of immunity under certain circumstances, but provided no waiver ap-
plicable to the facts of Grandstaff.
209. 767 F.2d at 169 (citing Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978);
Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3476,
87 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1985); Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838 (5th Cir.) (en banc), rev'd
on other grounds, 739 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc)).
210. "The policy must be 'the moving force of the constitutional violation.'" 767 F.2d at
169 (quoting Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). The court
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Throughout the opinion in Grandstaff the court revealed an obvious tone
of rebuke for the callous disregard for innocent life shown by the city of
Borger police force both before and after the incident. Interestingly, the
court admitted that no evidence had been introduced to show a pattern of
prior misconduct and thereby establish a policy of the city to use deadly
force without justification; instead the court concluded that the city's actions
following the shooting demonstrated the policy that was the causal link to
the plaintiff's death:
The disposition of the policymaker may be inferred from his conduct
after the events of that night. Following this incompetent and cata-
strophic performance, there were no reprimands, no discharges, and no
admissions of error. The officers testified at the trial that no changes
had been made in their policies. If that episode of such dangerous reck-
lessness obtained so little attention and action by the City policymaker,
the jury was entitled to conclude that it was accepted as the way things
are done and have been done in the City of Borger. If prior policy had
been violated, we would expect to see a different reaction .... [T]he
subsequent acceptance of dangerous recklessness by the policymaker
tends to prove his preexisting disposition and policy.211
Consequently, the court affirmed the decision of the district court with re-
spect to the liability of the city of Borger under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.212
B. Texas Supreme Court
In 1985 the Texas Legislature repealed the Texas Tort Claims Act
pointed out that proof of inadequate training usually will not satisfy the policy-cause require-
ment for liability under § 1983. The court voiced doubt that a finding of gross negligence in
police training would always result in municipal liability. 767 F.2d at 170; accord Oklahoma
City v. Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. 2427, 2435-36, 85 L. Ed. 2d 791, 803-04 (1985) (plaintiff did not
prove that inadequate training constituted a "policy" under Monell without evidence that
policymakers consciously chose an inadequate training program). But see Turpin v. Mailet,
619 F.2d 196, 201-02 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980); Reeves v. City of Jackson,
608 F.2d 644, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1979); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1246-47 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979).
211. 767 F.2d at 171; cf. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 219 (1974) (subsequent
acts tended to prove the nature of a prior conspiracy); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (subsequent conduct proved discriminatory motive in a prior employ-
ment decision).
212. The reaction of the United States Supreme Court to the Fifth Circuit's opinion in City
of Borger is awaited with interest. Although the facts of the case are so shocking as to cause
one to feel emotionally that the city should bear the liability for its grossly negligent police
officers, the establishment of an official city policy based upon acts occurring subsequent to the
shooting greatly expands previous holdings with regard to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In fact this infer-
ence of a policy was "too big a leap" for the dissenting Justice Garwood. He would have
required some actual proof of authorization or approval of the officer's recklessness: "What we
are really doing is punishing the City, not for wrongfully or unconstitutionally bringing about
this tragedy, but for its post-event callousness. That is not actionable under section 1983 ......
Id. at 173 (Garwood, J., dissenting). As the majority pointed out, however, the circumstantial
inference of the policy may be necessary as "[a]n injured plaintiff is not likely to document
proof of a policy or disposition, either of the policymaker or throughout the police force, that
disregards human life and safety." Id. at 171. Certainly such an expansion of the scope of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 will, in the future, cause municipal authorities within the Fifth Circuit's juris-
diction to rebuke their employees quickly and publicly for alleged negligent conduct.
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(TTCA) and codified it under the new Civil Practice and Remedies Code.213
While the general effect of this revised version of the TTCA remains to be
seen, some decisions by Texas courts during the Survey period under the old
version remain significant after the codification because they construe provi-
sions that remain substantively unchanged. In Black v. Nueces County Ru-
ral Fire Prevention District No. 2214 a volunteer fireman sought damages
from the appellee-district and the city of Corpus Christi for injuries sus-
tained after being struck by a fire truck as it backed into position at the scene
of a fire. The trial court found that the facts of the case fell within old
section 3(b) of the TTCA, which waives governmental immunity in situa-
tions where injury results from the "use of a motor-driven vehicle ... under
circumstances where [the] officer or employee ... would be personally liable
to the claimant in accordance with the law of this state. .... ",215 The court of
appeals reversed the trial court and held that section 14(8) applied to the
instant case which excepts the municipality from the section 4 waiver of
immunity with regard to "[a]ny claim arising out of the action of an officer,
agent or employee while responding to emergency calls or reacting to emer-
gency situations when such action is in compliance with the laws and ordi-
nances applicable to emergency action."'216
The supreme court reversed the appeals court and held that a governmen-
tal unit could take advantage of this exemption only when laws and ordi-
nances addressing emergency situations have been previously enacted with
respect to the emergency situation resulting in the injuries in question. 21 7
The supreme court disagreed with the Nueces County court of appeals' in-
terpretation of section 14 as requiring only that no law or ordinance have
been violated during the emergency procedure.218 The court reasoned that
the plain language of the statute required that the appellant, in order to be
eligible for the exemption, comply with laws during such procedure that ap-
pellant admitted did not exist. 219 In contrast to the majortiy in Black, Chief
Justice Hill, writing for the dissent,220 rejected the majority's construction as
placing an unreasonable burden on governing bodies to promulgate compre-
hensive laws and ordinances covering every emergency situation in order
take advantage of the exemption; he cited the legislative intent of providing
213. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.001-.109 (Vernon Pam. 1986). The
TTCA previously was listed under TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (Vernon 1970, as
amended), repealed by Act of June 16, 1985, ch. 959, § 9(1), 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
(Vernon).
214. 695 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. 1985).
215. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 3(b) (Vernon 1970, as amended) (re-
pealed 1985); see TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021(l)(A) & (B) (Vernon Pam.
1986) (new codification retains essentially the same language).
216. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 14(8) (Vernon 1970, as amended) (re-
pealed 1985); see TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.055 (Vernon Pam. 1986) (new
codification contains no substantive change).
217. 695 S.W.2d at 563.
218. Id.
219. The holding in Black was said to be in accord with the Act's mandate of liberal con-
struction of its provisions. Id.
220. Chief Justice Hill was joined by Justices McGee and Gonzalez. Id.
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an exemption for emergencies except when the conduct violates laws and
ordinances. 22
1
In Alvarado v. City of Lubbock222 the plaintiffs appealed a ruling of the
appeals court affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of the city of Lubbock on the basis that the city owed no duty to the plaintiff.
The Alvarado family brought suit against the city and others, alleging the
wrongful death of a family member in an automobile accident. Specifically,
the plaintiffs alleged that the failure of the city to replace a fifty-five mile per
hour speed limit sign when the city had earlier lowered the speed limit
within the area in question to fifty miles per hour amounted to negligence on
the part of the city. 2 2 3 The city denied any obligation to replace the sign,
relying partially upon a 1973 telephone conversation between its traffic engi-
neering director and a district engineer for the State Highway Commission
in which they agreed that the state would assume the maintenance of all
speed limit signs on state highways in Lubbock. The Texas Supreme Court
reasoned that although a municipal governing body and the State Highway
commission had the statutory authority to reach agreements regarding state
highway maintenance, 224 the oral agreement between the two engineers was
insufficient to relieve the city of its statutory responsibilities. 225
Alternatively, the city claimed that Texas statutes mandate exclusive state
control over speed limit sign maintenance 226 and that the city had not
waived its governmental immunity under the TTCA.2 27 With respect to the
city's first contention, the court held that speed limit sign control is not al-
ways exclusive because cities are entitled by statute to alter speed limits
within city limits. 228 In addition, because the city had failed to establish an
effective agreement with the state, it failed to show conclusively that it owed
no duty to the deceased with respect to the sign and, therefore, summary
judgment was inappropriate. 229 The supreme court also rejected the city's
latter contention that it had not waived governmental immunity under the
221. Id. at 563-64. Although the dissent's argument may somewhat overstate the task in
light of the broad language that may be used in drafting such laws, it would seem that because
of the significant split in the court and the likelihood that other suits involving emergency
situations will be brought under this provision, some clarifying legislative pronouncement
would be appropriate.
222. 685 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. 1985).
223. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6701d, § 169(b) (Vernon 1977) provides: "The gov-
erning body of an incorporated city ... with respect to any highway ... within its corporate
limits, shall have the same authority by city ordinance to alter maximum prima facie speed
limits . . . as that delegated to the State Highway Commission ...... The speed limit in
question was changed pursuant to this statute.
224. 685 S.W.2d at 648.
225. Id.; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6673(b) (Vernon 1977); cf Hale v. City of
Dallas, 335 S.W.2d 785, 792 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (city effectively
shifted all responsibility for maintenance of a highway to the state).
226. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6701d, § 30 (Vernon 1977) (authorizing State
Highway Commission to place and maintain or provide for such placement and maintenance
of traffic-control devices); id. art. 6701f (directing the State Highway Commission to erect and
maintain speed signs).
227. See supra note 213.
228. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6701d, § 169(b) (Vernon 1983).
229. 685 S.W.2d at 648.
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TTCA, 2 3 0 stating that "[s]ection 14(12) excepts from the Act's ambit [a]ny
claim arising from the absence, condition, or malfunction of any traffic or
road sign, signal, or warning device unless such absence, condition or mal-
function shall not be corrected by the governmental unit responsible within a
reasonable time after notice."' 231 The court held that because the accident
involved the "absence of or condition of a traffic sign" a fact question existed
as to whether the city had notice of the erroneous sign and had failed to
correct the same within a reasonable period of time. 232 Accordingly, the
court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court
for trial on the merits. 233
C. Texas Courts of Appeals
In Fitts v. City of Beaumont234 the Beaumont court of appeals struck
down a city charter provision of the city of Beaumont requiring that the city
council receive notice of a claim for personal injuries within sixty days of the
injury as being in violation of the open courts provision of the Texas Consti-
tution.235 The parties stipulated that the plaintiff in Fitts had been injured in
a fall on city property and that the plaintiff gave notice of a claim against the
city sixty-six days after the injury. Initially, the court rejected the plaintiff's
contention that the city charter's notice provision violated the Texas Consti-
tution on the basis that it denied her the general two-year period of limita-
tions provided for personal injury cases. 236 The court stated that notice of
claim provisions are premised upon the reasonable need of the city to investi-
230. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 4 (Vernon 1970) (repealed 1985)
(prescribes the extent of the waiver of sovereign immunity); see TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. §§ 101.023-.025 (Vernon Pam. 1986) (new codification regarding extent of
waiver).
231. 685 S.W.2d at 648-49 (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 14(12)
(Vernon 1970) (repealed 1985)); see TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.060(a)(2)
(Vernon Pam. 1986) (codification of § 4 retains essentially same language).
232. 685 S.W.2d at 648-49. In addition, the supreme court concluded that fact issues were
presented as to whether the city owed a duty to the plaintiff and whether it had received proper
notice from the plaintiffs of the pending action as required by § 16 of the old TTCA. Id.
Section 16 provides that "[e]xcept where there is actual notice on the part of the governmental
unit that death has occurred .... any person making a claim hereunder shall give notice of the
same to the governmental unit against which such claim in made .... within six months from
the date of the incident." TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 16 (Vernon 1970) (re-
pealed 1985); see TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.101 (Vernon Pam. 1986) (new
codification retains same notice requirement). The court also felt that the notice requirement
might not be applicable because certain of the plaintiffs were under age sixteen. 685 S.W.2d at
649; see City of Houston v. Torres, 621 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Tex. 1981) (minority being consid-
ered an excusing disability; also recognizes other physical or mental incapacity as an accepta-
ble reason for failing to meet the notice requirements established in the TTCA or city
charters).
233. 685 S.W.2d at 649.
234. 688 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
235. TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 13, provides: "All courts shall be open, and every person for an
injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law." This language is popularly known as the "open courts" provision of the Texas Constitu-
tion pursuant to which all citizens are guaranteed access to the courts of the state.
236. TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5, provides that city charter provisions shall not be enacted so
as to conflict with the Texas Constitution or the general laws of the State of Texas.
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gate a claim "while facts are fresh and conditions remain substantially the
same . ". .. 237
Having disposed of the appellant's first point of error, the court turned to
the alternative contention that the sixty-day notice requirement violated the
open courts provision of the Texas Constitution. Though no Texas court
had specifically addressed the issue of whether a specific time period for no-
tice of a claim conflicts with the open courts provision, the court relied upon
previous Texas cases holding that the open courts clause prohibits unreason-
able limitation provisions.238 In striking down the Beaumont charter provi-
sion as an unreasonable limitation on an injured party's right to seek redress
in the courts of the state, the court noted that the sixty-day limit was arbi-
trarily established by the city and found the six-month time limit for notice
of claims under the TTCA to be persuasive evidence as to what period for
giving notice of claim should be considered reasonable. 239
In City of Houston v. Arney240 the plaintiff brought an action for damages
against the city of Houston under the TTCA, alleging that the city health
clinic's failure to inform the plaintiff of a precancerous condition revealed by
a Pap smear later caused her to have to undergo a complete hysterectomy.
After finding that the default judgment taken against the city had the effect
of establishing its liability, 241 the court considered whether the trial court's
award of $502,500 in damages to the plaintiff was contrary to the TTCA's
express limitation of liability to $100,000 per occurrence per person.242 The
trial court had ruled favorably on the plaintiff's contention that the legisla-
ture's passage of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act 243
had the effect of waiving the damage limitations set forth in the TTCA be-
cause it insured hospitals in excess of $100,000. The appellee also argued
that just as the default judgment had the effect of admitting liability on be-
half of the city, it also had the effect of admitting and establishing the dam-
age award, and, therefore, the city could not contest the award on appeal. 244
The court held that although the city had expressly waived governmental
237. 688 S.W.2d at 184. In addition, the court recognized that notice of claim provisions
aid and encourage settlement of litigation and preparation for trial. Id. (citing City of Houston
v. Torres, 621 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Tex. 1981)).
238. 688 S.W.2d at 184; see Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 923 (Tex. 1984) (TEX. INS.
CODE ANN. art. 5.82, § 4 (repealed 1977) violative of art. I, § 13, because absolute limitation
period established instead of accrual period); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex. 1983)
(limitations period of TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.82, § 4 (repealed 1977) held violative of art.
I, § 13, as applied to minors).
239. See supra note 213.
240. 680 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
241. Id. at 874 ("The default judgment against the City as to liability had the effect of
admitting that the plaintiff had a viable cause of action under the waiver provisions of the
TTCA."). The plaintiff in Arney was granted a default judgment as a result of the city's failure
to timely respond to requested interrogatories.
242. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 3(b) (Vernon 1970, as amended) (re-
pealed 1985) (liability of governmental unit for negligence under the TTCA is limited to
$100,000 per person injured); see TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.023 (Vernon
Pam. 1986) (provides, in addition, $300,000 limit for each single occurrence of bodily injury or
death).
243. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i (Vernon Supp. 1986).
244. 680 S.W.2d at 874.
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immunity under the TTCA,245 it had not waived the limitation of liability
and no such waiver could be inferred or implied either by its taking of a
default judgment against it or by the provisions of a supplemental statute not
expressly waiving the limitation. 246
In City of Denton v. Page247 the plaintiffs had rented a house near a barn
used by the landowner for storage that had been set on fire by arsonists on
several occasions. On each occasion the local Denton Fire Department was
summoned and the fire marshall made inspections of the premises. The barn
was set aflame for yet a fourth time, and as a result the plaintiff-lessee suf-
fered severe burns. Further inspection revealed that several full gasoline
cans had been left in the barn. The plaintiff-lessee and his wife sued the city
of Denton, 24 8 alleging, among other grounds, that the city was negligent for
failing to establish adequate procedures to prevent future fires and failing to
conduct an adequate inspection of the barn.249 The court of appeals rejected
the first ground for relief alleged by the plaintiffs because it failed to come
within a specific waiver provision of the TTCA.25 ° The court reasoned that
procedures for fire prevention were policy decisions, and "if the negligence
causing an injury lies in the formulating of policy . . . the government re-
mains immune from liability. '25 1
Although it rejected the plaintiff's first contention, the court found that
the plaintiff's various allegations as to the city's failure to inspect and guard
adequately against the dangerous condition of the barn properly stated a
cause of action under section (3)(b)(3) of the TTCA, which waived immu-
nity for "injuries so caused from some condition or some use of tangible
property" as a result of the gasoline cans left in the barn. 252 The court em-
245. The court found that the plaintiffs allegations stated a claim under § 3 of the TTCA,
which provides for waiver of governmental immunity when a plaintiff is injured by a use of, or
condition of, property. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 3 (Vernon 1970) (repealed
1985). The allegations were a negligent use of books and records and failure to inform the
patient. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021(2) (Vernon Pam. 1986) (new
codification of § 3).
246. 680 S.W.2d at 875. "A sovereign does not waive the $100,000.00 limit of liability...
by failure to plead and urge it." Id. at 874 (citing City of Dallas v. Smith, 130 Tex. 225, 237,
107 S.W.2d 872, 877 (1937); Bryant v. Mission Mun. Hosp., 575 S.W.2d 136, 137 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ)); see also Sam Bassett Lumber Co. v. City of Houston,
145 Tex. 492, 496, 198 S.W.2d 879, 881 (1947) (general provisions of law must yield to specific
provisions).
247. 683 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ granted and dism'd).
248. The plaintiff also sued the landowner alleging, among other grounds, that the city had
failed to comply with the laws of the city of Denton and had failed to warn plaintiffs ade-
quately of a dangerous condition.
249. 683 S.W.2d at 187.
250. Id. at 188.
251. Id. (citing State v. Terrell, 588 S.W.2d 784, 788 (Tex. 1979)). The court also relied
upon TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 14(9) (Vernon 1970) (repealed 1985) in
denying plaintiff relief on its first ground. "The provisions of this Act shall not apply to: ...
[a]ny claim based on an injury or death connected with any act or omission ... arising out of
the failure to provide, or the method of providing, police or fire protection." Id.; see TEX. CIv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.055(3) (Vernon Pam. 1986).
252. 683 S.W.2d at 188; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 3(b) (Vernon
1970, as amended). This provision is now codified in the Civil Practices and Remedies Code
and states that "[a] governmental unit in the state is liable for: ... (2) personal injury and
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phasized that despite the earlier inspections by the fire marshall, the plain-
tiffs had not been warned of the presence of this dangerous condition, and
the city did not correct it after its discovery. In applying the liberal con-
struction mandated by section 13 of the TTCA,253 the court rejected the
city's interpretation that the governmental unit must own, occupy, or con-
trol the property from which the injuries result in order to be liable under
section 3(b) of the TTCA.254 The court reasoned that because private citi-
zens have been held liable for failing to correct dangerous conditions, 255 the
portion of the statute stating that a governmental unit may be held liable for
injuries caused "under circumstances where such unit of government, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of
this state" established that the city was subject to liability under section
3(b). 2 5 6
The court next found sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that
the lessee was an invitee and that the city, as an independent contractor, had
a duty of reasonable care to inspect the barn and warn him of the dangerous
condition. 257 The evidence indicated that the fire marshall was negligent in
that he knew or should have known in the exercise of ordinary care, about
the gasoline stored in the barn.258 Finally, the court rejected the city's claim
that the trial court erred in awarding the lessee $100,000 in addition to a
$31,000 award to his wife, in apparent contravention of the provisions of the
death so caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property if the governmental
unit would, were it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law." TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021 (Vernon Pam. 1986).
The Supreme Court of Texas has interpreted § 3(b) of the TTCA as waiving governmental
immunity for injuries arising out of three general areas: (1) use of publicly owned vehicles;
(2) premises defects; and (3) injuries from some condition or use of the property. Salcedo v. El
Paso Hosp. Dist., 659 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Tex. 1983); see generally Geary & Davenport, 1984
Annual Survey, supra note 61, at 487-88.
In Page, the court rejected the city's characterization of the plaintiffs' claim as based upon a
premises defect. The presence of the gasoline cans clearly represented a dangerous condition
and was so characterized by the plaintiffs' pleadings. 683 S.W.2d at 188.
253. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 13 (Vernon 1970) (repealed 1985) (this
provision is not included in the new Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code).
254. 683 S.W.2d at 189. The city of Denton alleged that it could be liable only if it (1) neg-
ligently furnished or used some item of tangible property or (2) was the owner, occupier, or
furnisher of defective property. Id. at 188.
255. Strakos v. Chering, 360 S.W.2d 787, 796 (Tex. 1962); Gundolf v. Massman-Johnson,
473 S.W.2d 70, 73 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1971), writ ref'd n.r.e., per curiam, 484 S.W.2d 585
(Tex. 1972) (defendants liable for failure to correct dangerous condition).
256. 683 S.W.2d at 190; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 3(b) (Vernon
1970, as amended) (repealed 1985) (recodified in TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 101.021 (Vernon Pam. 1986)).
257. 683 S.W.2d at 194; see Thomas v. Oil & Gas Bldg., Inc., 582 S.W.2d 873, 879 (Tex
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (independent contractor owes a duty to
invitees).
258. 683 S.W.2d at 197. The court held that the landowner's and the fire marshall's admis-
sions that further fires were likely, the implied invitation from the landowner to the lessee
extending to the inside of the barn, and the fact that the fire marshall conducted investigations
with a view to future fires, all pointed to the foreseeability of the fire and the lessee's presence
in the barn at the time of the fire, and thereby established the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries. Id. at 201.
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TTCA expressly limiting a city's liability to $100,000.259 The court rea-
soned that the wife's recovery was predicated upon her own mental anguish,
loss of consortium, and loss of services suffered. 260
VIII. PROCEDURAL MATTERS
A. Civil Service Commissions
In Patton v. City of Grand Prairie261 the Texas Supreme Court considered
whether a city's civil service commission may reduce the indefinite suspen-
sion of a police officer, as ordered by a police chief, to a disciplinary (tempo-
rary) suspension of fifteen days or less, thereby foreclosing the affected
officer's right to appeal either decision to a district court. Pursuant to the
Fireman's and Policeman's Civil Service Act 262 an officer has the right to
appeal to a district court an indefinite suspension that the civil service com-
mission imposes on its own or by affirming a police chiefs decision. 263 In
1979, however, the supreme court had ruled in Firemen's & Policemen's Civil
Service Commission v. Blanchard264 that disciplinary suspensions under the
Act were not subject to judicial review. 265 The supreme court in Patton
ruled that Blanchard was no longer controlling due to the 1977 and 1979
amendments to the Act that provide for judicial review of any commission
decision, whether it involved an indefinite or only a temporary
suspension. 266
In Horrocks v. City of Grand Prairie267 the supreme court considered the
procedural rights of a suspended police officer in appealing a decision of a
civil service commission that the commission had not reduced to writing as
259. Id. at 206; see supra note 242 and accompanying text.
260. 683 S.W.2d at 206-07. As her claim for loss of household services was derivative(based upon the lessee's injuries), the appeals court reduced the amount awarded by the trial
court by the degree of the lessee's comparative negligence, just as the trial court had done to
the award for the loss of consortium.
261. 686 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. 1985).
262. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m (Vernon 1963 & Pam. Supp. 1986).
263. Id. § 18 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986).
264. 582 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. 1979).
265. Id. at 779. This authority is the same as that the court of appeals in Patton relied
upon in holding that the district court had no jurisdiction to hear the officer's appeal of the
commission's order. Patton v. City of Grand Prairie, 675 S.W.2d 794, 796 (Tex. App.-Dal-
las), rev'd, 686 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. 1985). The appellate court held that in determining whether
the suspension was indefinite or temporary, the sanction the employer ultimately imposed was
important, whether it was the police chief's decision, or the civil service commission's appellate
decision. Id. at 796.
266. 686 S.W.2d at 109-10. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m, § 18 (Vernon Pam.Supp. 1986) (emphasis added), provides: "In the event any.., police officer is dissatisfied with
any decision of the Commission, he may ... file a petition in the District Court .... " The
emphasized word was substituted for "the" by amendment in 1977. In 1979 the legislature
amended the Act to provide that "the commission shall, on appeal of the suspended officer or
employee, hold a public hearing as prescribed by Section 17 of this Act." Id. § 16b(a). Note
that the 1977 amendment was already in force at the time of the Blanchard decision, and the
1979 amendment does not appear to have had any direct impact on this issue. In reality, the
supreme court appears within six years to have made an about-face and now accepts the literal
language of the Act, which allows an appeal regardless of the duration of the suspension.
267. 704 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. 1986).
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the relevant statute required.268 Citing Patton v. City of Grand Prairie, the
court held that the officer could properly appeal the commission's decision
to the district court.269 The court once again recognized that any decision of
the civil service commission may be appealed. 270
In Downs v. City of Fort Worth,27 1 in an issue of first impression, the court
of appeals rejected an indefinitely suspended police officer's contention that
the police chief or department head implementing the suspension must in-
form the suspended party not only of his right to a hearing before the civil
service commission, but also of his right to an independent third-party exam-
iner in lieu of a commission hearing. 272 The court further ruled that if a
suspended party requests a hearing by an independent examiner, he must do
so within the ten-day period generally prescribed for notice of appeals to the
civil service commission. 27 3 Although the statute granting an independent
hearing does not place a time limit within which, a claimant must request
such a hearing 274 the court ruled that to not apply the ten-day limit rule to
suspension hearings would result in undue administrative delay. 275
City of Pasadena v. Cunningham276 involved a civil service commission's
decision to deny seniority points for the time a police officer worked for the
city as a police academy cadet and as a probationary patrolman. The statute
at issue provided that a police officer would receive one point for each year
served as a classified police officer in his or her department, with a ten-point
limit. 277 The statute further required city council ordinances to provide
classifications for police officers.278 Pursuant to this authority, Pasadena en-
acted an ordinance that prescribed six classifications, one of which was "Ca-
det," and another "Patrolman, Probationary." In light of these
classifications the court of appeals concluded that the civil service commis-
268. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m, § 16(b) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986). In a
similar case decided during the Survey period, City of Plano Firefighters' & Police Officers'
Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Maxam, 685 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the
court of appeals emphasized the need to adhere to the procedural rules for appealing a police
officer's suspension to a civil service commission. Id. at 125. The court held that the letter
from the suspended police officer's attorney, addressed to the commission, which simply re-
stated the charges against her and that she wished to appeal, did not amount to any of the
alternative required statements of (1) denying the charges' truth, (2) excepting to the charges'
legal sufficiency, and/or (3) alleging that the action recommended is not commensurate with
the offense charged. Id. at 127; see Firemen's and Policemen's Civil Service Act, TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m, § 17 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986) (procedure for appeal to civil
service commission).
269. 704 S.W.2d at 17.
270. Id.
271. 692 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
272. Id. at 211; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m, §§ 16b(b), 16c(a) (Vernon
Pam. Supp. 1986) (requiring suspended party to be informed of right to appeal to commission
and setting forth the right to a hearing by an independent third party examiner).
273. 692 S.W.2d at 212; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m, § 16b(b) (Vernon
Pam. Supp. 1985) (10-day notice requirement for appeals to the civil service commission).
274. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m, § 16c(a) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986).
275. 692 S.W.2d at 213; cf supra note 270.
276. 693 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
277. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m, § 14B (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986) (establish-
ing the seniority point system for promotion purposes).
278. Id. § 8A(a).
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sion had improperly denied seniority points for time the officer had worked
in those capacities. 279 had the ordinance omitted the "Cadet" and "Patrol-
man, Probationary" classifications, the commission apparently could have
withheld the seniority points.
B. Term Contract Nonrenewal Act
In Seifert v. Lingleville Independent School District280 the defendant
school district had established eighteen reasons for nonrenewal of school
teacher contracts pursuant to the Term Contract Nonrenewal Act
(TCNA). 281 The Texas Supreme Court upheld the plaintiff's claim that the
reason given for nonrenewal of her contract, a "community feeling of incom-
petence," could not be the basis for dismissal since the school's policy al-
lowed for nonrenewal in the event of "incompetence. '28 2 The court ruled
that the school district must act strictly within the policies that the legisla-
ture had prescribed.2 83 The court refused to consider the school district's
assertion that actual incompetence was the reason for the nonrenewal of
plaintiff's contract since the notice of nonrenewal given to a teacher must
state the specific reason therefor, not just provide fair notice.284
In Grounds v. Tolar Independent School District 285 the school district
sought a determination of its rights in the nonrenewal of a coach's employ-
ment contract. The primary issue was whether the defendant teacher was a
probationary employee, which would allow the district to deny him the pro-
cedural rights to evaluations, notices, and hearings that the district afforded
other teachers in the nonrenewal of their employment contracts. 286  The
279. 693 S.W.2d at 753. The issue of whether to credit a police officer seniority points for
time as a cadet was not actually before the court of appeals. Id. at 752 n. 1. The analysis set
forth, however, apparently applies to any classification a city council ordinance establishes for
police officers and firefighters.
280. 692 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. 1985).
281. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 21.201-.211 (Vernon Supp. 1986). This Act changed for-
mer law that allowed nonrenewal of school teacher contracts without any reason or hearing.
692 S.W.2d at 462.
282. 692 S.W.2d at 463.
283. Id.
284. Id. The court relied upon TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.204(c) (Vernon Supp. 1986),
which requires a renewal notice to specify all reasons for nonrenewal. Id.
285. 694 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ granted).
286. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.209 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (allowing probationary
period during which rest of subchapter inapplicable). When the school district denied the
defendant's request for a hearing, he appealed the decision to the State Commissioner of Edu-
cation. The commissioner held that the school district could not consider the defendant a
probationary employee and order that the district hold a hearing on the nonrenewal of the
defendant's teaching contract. The school district then filed the action in the Hood County
district court. After the district court held in favor of the school district, the defendant argued
on appeal that the school district's only avenue of redress was to appeal the education commis-
sioner's decision to the Travis County district court as specifically provided by TEX. EDUC.
CODE ANN. §§ 11.13(c) & 21.207 (Vernon Supp. 1986). The court of appeals pointed out,
however, that parties need not exhaust administrative remedies in matters involving pure ques-
tions of law in the administration of school law. 694 S.W.2d at 243, (citing Calvin V.
Koltermann, Inc. V. Underream Piling Co., 563 S.W.2d 950, 955 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). The court of appeals held that the procedural issues before
the court were questions of law and "[t]he Commissioner of Education does not exercise judi-
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TCNA authorizes school districts to adopt written policies of probation de-
nying the Act's rights to any teacher in the first two years of employment. 28 7
Since the school district in this case had adopted a probationary employee
policy well after the effective date of the defendant's second one-year con-
tract term, the court ruled that the district could not apply the policy retro-
actively to govern the rights of the defendant. 288  Thus, the defendant was
entitled to the procedural rights afforded other teachers in the nonrenewal of
employment contracts. 28 9 The court of appeals also rejected the trial court's
holding that the defendant had consented to probationary status by initialing
a teacher evaluation form that indicated such status on its face.290 The court
reasoned that this act acknowledged only the evaluation, and not the proba-
tionary status.29 '
The notice of nonrenewal sent to the defendant did not state the reasons
for nonrenewal. Under such circumstance the TCNA mandates that the
school district offer the defendant employment in the same professional ca-
pacity for an additional year. 292 Since the district, in an attempt to settle the
case, had offered a contract to teach without coaching duties, the court then
considered whether a teacher and a coach were within the same professional
capacity. 293 The Texas Education Code does not create a separate classifica-
tion for coaches. 294 The court concluded, therefore, that unless a coach's
contract expressly limits the coach's duties, the district may reassign him to
other teaching positions if it so chooses. 295 Since the defendant's contract
expressly reserved to the district the right of reassignment, and since he had
rejected the offered teaching contract that excluded coaching duties, the
court ruled that he had voluntarily ended his employment. 29 6
cial power to determine the legality of contracts or the legal rights of parties thereto." 694
S.W.2d at 244 (citing Board of Trustees v. Briggs, 486 S.W.2d 829, 835 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1972, writ refd n.r.e.)). Thus, the district had appropriately filed the case in the
Hood County district court.
287. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.209 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
288. 694 S.W.2d at 244. The district's attempt to apply the new probation policy retroac-
tively to the defendant's first two years of employment ran afoul of the well-settled principle
that certainty in the law requires that contracting parties know their obligations under their
contracts. Id. (citing Hardware Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Berglund, 393 S.W.2d 309, 315 (Tex.
1965); Estate of Griffin v. Sumner, 604 S.W.2d 221, 230 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980,
writ refd n.r.e.)).
289. 694 S.W.2d at 244.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.204(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986) provides: "In the event of
failure to give such notice of proposed nonrenewal within the time herein specified, the board
of trustees shall thereby elect to employ such employee in the same professional capacity for
the succeeding school year."
293. 694 S.W.2d at 245.
294. "Teacher" is defined as "a superintendent, principal, supervisor, classroom teacher,
counselor, or other full-time professional employee, except paraprofessional personnel, who is
required to hold a valid certificate or teaching permit." TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.201(1)
(Vernon Supp. 1986).




C. Miscellaneous Procedural Matters
In Harrison v. City of San Antonio297 several police officers sued the city
and the police officer's association, asserting that their promotion examina-
tion deviated from the criteria established in a collective bargaining agree-
ment. 298 The agreement between the city and the police officer's association
provided for an Assessment Center Examination, which consisted, among
other things, of a structured, three-member board interview. 299 The city, the
association's president, and several members of the association's board of
directors, relying upon the advice of a psychologist regarding the effective-
ness of various testing procedures, subsequently agreed to use a five-member
testing board and to substitute an oral examination for the structured inter-
view. 300 Drawing upon corporate law principles, 30 1 the court ruled in favor
of the police officers and refused to give effect to the subsequent changes in
the testing procedure.30 2 Since the alterations to the collective bargaining
agreement were not routine matters, they represented a "deviation that re-
quired specific authority from the [Police Officer's Association] membership
or, if authorized by the membership, the Board of Directors [of the Associa-
tion]. ' 30 3 Thus, the alterations to the collective bargaining agreement and
the examinations administered in conformity therewith were void.3°4 Fur-
thermore, as two different groups underwent the oral examination over a
two-day period, the court found a violation of the Civil Service Act's man-
date that each applicant receive an identical examination in the presence of
all other applicants. 305
297. 695 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
298. Id. at 273. The city had adopted the Firemen's and Policemen's Civil Service Act.
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m (Vernon 1982 & Pam. Supp. 1986) and the Fire and
Police Employee Relations Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5154c-I (Vernon Supp.
1986). The court stated that the latter Act "grants the City and the police department the
right to negotiate collective bargaining agreements. When a contract has been negotiated by
representatives of the City and the Association, it is then approved by the City, and submitted
to the membership of the Association for its approval." 695 S.W.2d at 273.
299. The structured interview was to involve questions and answers in an exchange be-
tween the candidate and the examiners outside of the presence of the other candidates covering
topics the examiners had given the candidates in advance. It might have lasted between twelve
and twenty minutes. 695 S.W.2d at 275.
300. The oral examination involved an extemporaneous speech not to exceed ten minutes
in length, covering topics given one hour in advance, in the presence of the other promotion
candidates. Id.
301. The San Antonio Police Department was incorporated and subject at the time of trial
to the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 1396-1.01 to -
11.01 (Vernon 1982).
302. 695 S.W.2d at 277.
303. Id. at 276.
304. The alterations also failed to comply with the statute of frauds. TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 26.01(a) (Vernon 1968) (agreement not to be performed within one year re-
quires writing), and the agreement's express provisions requiring all modifications to be in
writing. 695 S.W.2d at 276. The parties never reduced the changes to writing, other than in
the form of a "Memorandum of Agreement and Understanding" signed by the association's
president and the city manager. Id. at 274.
305. 695 S.W.2d at 277; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m, § 14D (Vernon Pam.
Supp. 1986); see also id. art. 5154c- 1, § 20(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (valid collective bargaining
agreement controls over contrary provisions of the Fire and Police Employee Relations Act).
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In Television Cable Service, Inc. v. Bryant30 6 an Abilene resident sought to
require the local television cable franchisee to extend service to his home on
the outskirts of the city limits. Following the trial court's entry of judgment
in favor of the plaintiff, the city of Abilene filed a petition in intervention,
claiming that it was an indispensable party to the interpretation of the
franchise agreement. 30 7 The court of appeals agreed with the city and held
that the trial court had erred in denying the primary jurisdiction of the Abi-
lene city council and in not requiring the plaintiff to exhaust his administra-
tive remedies. 308 The plaintiff had alleged a franchise complaint, claiming
that the franchisee was bound by its agreement with the city to extend cable
service to him. In the court's view, such a complaint was not a judicial
matter.3
09
In City of Houston v. Jones3 10 certain builders sought judicial review of the
city's decision to halt construction in progress pursuant to a commercial
building permit. In affirming the city's action, the court of appeals relied
upon the plaintiffs' failure to file a certified copy of the deed restrictions
governing the use of the property. 311 The dissent in this case argued, how-
ever, that the plaintiffs were entitled to judicial review with an eye toward
possible changed circumstances that justified uses contrary to old deed re-
strictions.3 12 Since no complaints of nonconforming uses existed, the dis-
senting justice would have held that the restrictive covenants were no longer
of value in that they had been either modified or waived. 3 13 The majority's
decision implies that considerations of enforceability will be relevant only in
a judicial review of the refusal to issue a commercial building permit for
which a party has made proper application.
306. 684 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1984, no writ).
307. Id. at 198. The franchise agreement between the city and the defendant provided:
"The City reserves the right to determine and fix charges and fares and to regulate the kind of
service to be rendered . Id.
308. Id. at 198-99.
309. Id. at 199. The court stated that the city council had the power to act upon the
plaintiff's complaint, and that such action was within its conferred powers. Id.
310. 679 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
311. Id. at 559; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 974a-2, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986):
A person who desires a commercial building permit shall file with his applica-
tion a certified copy of any instrument which contains a restriction on the use of
or construction on the property described in the application, together with a
certified copy of any amendment, judgment, or other document affecting the use
of the property.
312. 679 S.W.2d at 560-62 (Sears, J., dissenting); see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
974a-2, § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1986): "In the event of changed conditions within a subdivision or
any other legally sufficient reason that restrictions should be modified a person refused a com-
mercial building permit can petition a court of appropriate jurisdiction to alter the restrictions
to better conform with present conditions."
313. 679 S.W.2d at 562 (Sears, J., dissenting); see New Jerusalem Baptist Church, Inc. v.
City of Houston, 598 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ) (set-
ting forth standard in waiver of deed restriction case); City of Houston v. Emmanuel United
Pentecostal Church, Inc., 429 S.W.2d 679, 682 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (restrictive covenants of no value not enforceable).
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IX. INTERPRETATIONS OF VARIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, AND ORDINANCES
Several cases decided during the Survey period defy easy categorization.
They are nevertheless worthy of some discussion in this article. Mabe v. City
of Galveston3 14 represents a victory for citizen's rights groups under the first
amendment to the United States Constitution.31 5 The defendant, a Galves-
ton Beach businessman, successfully appealed the imposition of a temporary
injunction prohibiting him from distributing a pamphlet that listed the
names and phone numbers of Galveston city council and park board mem-
bers. The pamphlet's purpose was to aid interested parties in contacting
those responsible for the lack of public restroom facilities on the beach-
front. 316 The sole issue before the court of appeals was whether the tempo-
rary injunction operated as a prior restraint in violation of the defendant's
first amendment right to freedom of speech. 31 7 Although Texas courts rec-
ognized a right to privacy, the court in Mabe was reluctant to permit prior
restraint on speech merely to protect an alleged threat to the limited right to
privacy of public officials. 318 Since the names and phone numbers appeared
in public phone books and documents, and since the pamphlets bore a direct
relationship to a public interest, the court set aside the injunction against
distribution of the pamphlets. 3 19
In Olsham Demolishing Co. v. Angleton Independent School District320 the
plaintiff sought additional compensation from the school district on a con-
tract for the demolition of a building when it discovered the unexpected
existence of three additional concrete slabs that required removal. The
school district argued that the Texas Constitution prohibited the payment of
314. 687 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ dism'd).
315. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the free-
dom of speech .. " This provision was made applicable to the states by U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
316. 687 S.W.2d at 771. The defendant resorted to this tactic only after making several
appearances before, and complaints to, the city council and park board. Id. The pamphlet
resulted in the council and board members' receiving numerous phone calls at their homes
during all times of the day and night complaining of the absence of beachfront restrooms. Id.
317. Id. A prior restraint, in constitutional law, generally refers to the imposition of a
restraint before the actual publication of material protected by the first amendment to the
United States Constitution. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919). It may also
refer, as in this case, to an infringement upon the constitutional right to disseminate materials
that the first amendment ordinarily protects without a prior judicial determination that the
material qualifies for first amendment protection. State v. I, A Woman-Part II, 53 Wis. 2d
102, 191 N.W.2d 897, 902-03 (1971).
318. 687 S.W.2d at 771-72; see Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964) (public offi-
cials' right to privacy is outweighed by citizens' right to criticize public business and express
matters of public concern); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (prior
restraints against distribution of pamphlets bear a heavy presumption of invalidity).
319. 687 S.W.2d at 772. The court based its rationale allowing distribution of the pam-
phlets in part upon the fact that the defendant did not act solely to harass the public officials,
and that the officials apparently could have opted for unlisted telephone numbers. Id. The
court did not consider as significant the question of whether the particular public officials
could take corrective action in connection with the defendant's complaint. Id.
320. 684 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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any amount in excess of the agreed and authorized contract sum. 32 1 The
court, however, held that the plaintiff was entitled to additional compensa-
tion since the demolition contract provided that the parties should equitably
adjust the authorized contract sum in the event of a concealed condition. 322
Thus, the contract provided for a change in the agreed compensation for
removal of the slabs, without triggering a constitutional prohibition.
323
In Daniels v. Morris324 two Texas children sought damages under the Civil
Rights Act,3 2 5 claiming that a denial of procedural due process had occurred
when, after they had moved out of their former school district, the school
principal unilaterally refused to allow them to continue studying at their
former school without paying tuition. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
examined the relevant provisions of the Texas Education Code, which state
that a child "shall be permitted to attend the public free schools of the dis-
trict in which he resides or in which his parent ... resides at the time he
applies for admission." '326 The court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that
the statute necessarily implies that the time of application for admission de-
termines the right to attend a particular school for the entire school year.
327
Resorting solely to the words of the statute, the court found that the stat-
ute's purpose was to protect schoolchildren's rights to attend the public free
school in the district in which they currently reside. 328 The court also held
that the school principal had not exceeded his authority in unilaterally deny-
ing tuition-free admission to the children 329 and found nothing that would
entitle the children to a property right requiring procedural due process.
330
In Pumpkin Air, Inc. v. City ofAddison 33 1 various aviation-related entities
sued the city and the municipal airport and its operators, alleging conspira-
torial anticompetitive conduct aimed at preventing them from selling fuel
and leasing space at the airport. The defendants moved for summary judg-
ment in reliance upon the defense of state action immunity. 332 This defense
321. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 53 prohibits counties and municipalities from paying addi-
tional compensation to contractors for services previously rendered or on contracts previously
entered into and performed in whole or in part.
322. 684 S.W.2d at 185.
323. Id.
324. 746 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1984).
325. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
326. 746 F.2d at 274; see TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
327. 746 F.2d at 276. The plaintiffs offered, in support of their reading of the statute, the
case of Brownsville Indep. School Dist. v. Gamboa, 498 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1973, writ refd n.r.e.). In that case, the court denied tuition-free admission to a public
school to a child whose residence "at the beginning of the ... school year ... was vague and
temporary." Id. at 451. The court in Daniels rejected the contention that this wording implied
that the child would have been entitled to attend school tuition-free for the entire school year
had her residence been clear at the beginning of the year. 746 F.2d at 276.
328. 746 F.2d at 277.
329. Id. The court stated that "Texas courts will abrogate school district policies only
when they clearly violate statutory provisions." Id.
330. Id. This holding comports with the United States Supreme Court's holding in Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), wherein the Court stated that "[p]ublic education is not a 'right'
granted to individuals by the Constitution." Id. at 221.
331. 608 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
332. Id. at 790. This defense was first articulated in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52
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allows a local government to engage in anticompetitive activities if done "in
furtherance or implementation of clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed state policy."' 333 The federal district court, however, in examining
provisions of the Texas Municipal Airports Act (TMAA), 334 found no such
articulated policy or authorization or other direct reference to the competi-
tive aspects of operating a municipal airport. 335 The court instead relied
upon a provision of the TMAA that federal and state laws override any
municipal ordinances adopted pursuant to the TMAA. 336 The court rea-
soned that even though the Texas Legislature has enacted no laws governing
the anticompetitive abuses alleged by the plaintiffs, the TMAA's provisions
were, at least with respect to such abuses, subordinate to the commands of
federal law, namely, the Sherman Act.337 The court concluded that the leg-
islature simply did not contemplate municipalities instituting anticompeti-
tive ordinances with regard to airport operations. 338 The defendants,
therefore, were unable to rely upon the defense of state action immunity and
the court dismissed their motion for summary judgment on that basis.339
In Heard v. Houston Post Co. 340 a court granted a permanent injunction
ordering the Harris County sheriff to make available to the plaintiff newspa-
per access to, or a copy of, offense reports whenever requested pursuant to
the Texas Open Records Act.34 1 The trial court ordered that these reports
(1943). The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982), prohibits any unreasonable interference,
by contract or combination, or conspiracy, with the ordinary, usual and freely competitive
pricing or distribution system of the open market in interstate trade. The United States
Supreme Court in Parker held that the Sherman Act does not restrain a state from anticompe-
titive activities directed by its legislature. 317 U.S. at 350. The Supreme Court extended this
ruling to municipalities in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 413
(1978). Federal courts have made state action immunity available to individuals when they
have acted pursuant to state authorization or approval. Hoover v. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. 1989,
1995, 80 L. Ed. 2d 590, 607 (1984); North Carolina ex rel. Edmisten v. P.I.A. Asheville, Inc.,
740 F.2d 274, 277 (4th Cir. 1984) (no requirement that the state compel the activities), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 1865, 85 L. Ed. 2d 159 (1985).
333. 608 F. Supp. at 790; see Community Communication Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S.
40, 48-51 (1982).
334. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 46d-1 (Vernon 1969).
335. 608 F. Supp. at 790-91.
336. Id. at 791; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 46d-7 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
337. 608 F. Supp. at 792; cf supra note 332 (setting forth relation of Sherman Act to state
action immunity).
338. 608 F. Supp. at 791 (quoting Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1025
(N.D. Tex. 1978) (exclusive airport taxicab franchise)). The court went on to grant the de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim under 49 U.S.C. § 1349(a)
(1982), which provides that "[tihere shall be no exclusive right for the use of any landing area
or air navigation facility upon which federal funds have been expended." Adopting the case of
Hill Aircraft & Leasing Corp. v. Fulton County, 561 F. Supp. 667, 673 (N.D. Ga. 1982), afid,
729 F.2d 1467 (11 th Cir. 1984), the court held that no private cause of action exists for viola-
tion of that statute. 608 F. Supp. at 794. Also, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) for alleged due process violations because "[tihe law does not recognize a
right under the due process clause to be free from 'anticompetitive injury.' " 608 F. Supp. at
794.
339. 608 F. Supp. at 794.
340. 684 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
341. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a (Vernon Supp. 1986). The requested of-




must contain virtually all of the facts and circumstances of an alleged of-
fense.342 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's order and held that
none of the information ordered disclosed was outside the Texas Supreme
Court's definition of public information in Houston Chronicle Publishing Co.
v. City of Houston.34 3 Although the sheriff argued that the release of an
offense report would result in harm to the individual charged, the court em-
phasized the event's newsworthiness, and held that the right to privacy is not
absolute. 344
In City of Dallas v. Gates345 a city employee and his wife sought to recover
unpaid health benefits owed them by the city. After agreeing to the entry of
a partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs for the unpaid benefits,
the city appealed the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the plaintiffs. 346
The court of appeals agreed with the city in ruling that the word corpora-
tion, as used in the Texas statutes allowing recovery of attorneys' fees from
an opponent, does not allow such recovery from a municipal corporation. 347
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the trial court erred in
not awarding penalties and interest against the city pursuant to the Texas
Insurance Code.3 4 8 In applying a strict construction, the court held that the
Insurance Code's authorization of such a recovery against health insurance
companies does not extend to recovery against a municipal corporation that
administers a self-insurance plan.349
City of Farmers Branch v. City ofAddison3 0 involved a contract requiring
Farmers Branch to construct a sanitary sewer line to which Addison could
attach its sewer lines. The contract gave Addison the right to connect its
lines at such times, present or future, and at such locations as that city
deemed desirable. Further, Addison had the right to deposit an unlimited
342. The trial court
signed a permanent injunction ordering the Sheriff to provide the [newspaper
within three hours of its request, a copy of the Sheriffs Department offense
report containing the following information: 1) the offense committed; 2) the
location of the crime; 3) the premises involved; 4) the time of the occurrence;
5) the property involved; 6) the vehicles involved; 7) the description of the
weather; 8) a detailed description of the offense in question; and, 9) the names of
the investigating officers.
684 S.W.2d at 211.
343. Id. at 212; see Houston Chronicle Publishing co. v. City of Houston, 631 S.W.2d 177,
187 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
344. 684 S.W.2d at 213; cf supra note 218 and accompanying text (discussing limits of
right to privacy). The court did recognize, however, that on occasions when some harm may
result from the release of a complainant's identity, the sheriff may seek a remedy by relating
the harm to a court of competent jurisdiction. 684 S.W.2d at 214.
345. 684 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1985, writ granted).
346. Fees were awarded pursuant to TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp.
1986) and TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1.14-1, § 7 (Vernon 1981).
347. 684 S.W.2d at 794. "[W]hen a statute uses the word 'corporation,' the statute 'is
construed to apply only to private corporations and does not include municipal corporations,
unless the statute expressly so provides.'" Id. (quoting State v. Central Power & Light Co.,
139 Tex. 51, 55, 161 S.W.2d 766, 768 (1942)).
348. 684 S.W.2d at 794; see TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.62 (Vernon 1981) (penalty for
delay in payment of losses).
349. 684 S.W.2d at 794.
350. 694 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
1986]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
quantity of sewage from a designated area within Addison into the Farmers
Branch sewer line. The court determined the contract to be a "surrender of
a consequential part of control and regulation of the system. 351 Since the
operation and maintenance of a sanitary sewer system is a governmental
function,3 52 and since the contract was in derogation of that function, the
court held it unenforceable.3 5 3 The court recognized that municipalities have
the authority to extend their sewer service outside their city limits, 354 but
this authority did not validate a sewer service contract that permitted an-
other party effectively to control the city's exercise of that governmental
power. 35
5
In City of Houston v. Nelius 3 5 6 a police officer ordered to pay the attor-
neys' fees incurred by the city in his unsuccessful appeal of a temporary
suspension, petitioned for a temporary injunction to prohibit the city from
withholding his paychecks to satisfy the order. The trial court granted the
injunction, and the city appealed, claiming that a contractual dispute was in
issue between an employer who owed wages and an employee who owed a
legally enforceable debt that he refused to pay. 357 Pursuant to charter and
code of ordinance provisions, the city appeared entitled to withhold the
paychecks.358 The court of appeals, however, found these provisions to con-
flict with constitutional provisions prohibiting the garnishment of wages ex-
cept in connection with payments of child support.3 59  The court also
examined whether Nelius consented to the withholding.3 60 The court re-
fused to consider the police officer's appeal as an implied consent to the gar-
nishment of his wages, and upheld the injunction prohibiting the city from
withholding the officer's paychecks. 361
351. Id. at 96.
352. Dilley v. City of Houston, 148 Tex. 191, 194, 222 S.W.2d 992, 993 (1949); Pittman v.
City of Amarillo, 598 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, writ refd n.r.e.); see
supra note 19.
353. 694 S.W.2d at 95.
354. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1108(3) (Vernon 1963).
355. 694 S.W.2d at 96.
356. 693 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ dism'd).
357. Id. at 569.
358. Houston City Charter art. VIII, § 3 and City Code of Ordinances § 2-111(b) man-
dated the withholding of payments to any person indebted to the city until the payment of the
debt. 693 S.W.2d at 569-70.
359. 693 S.W.2d at 570; see TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 28.
360. 693 S.W.2d at 569; see Benton v. Wilmer-Hutchins Indep. School Dist., 662 S.W.2d
696, 699 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ dism'd). The Nelius court adopted Benton and re-
ferred to TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 42.001(a), .002 (Vernon 1984), which exempt current
wages for personal services from attachment, execution, and seizure for the satisfaction of
debt. 693 S.W.2d at 569.
361. 693 S.W.2d at 569.
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